RAF chiefs were warned that the force's Nimrod spy planes were stricken with 60 problems that threatened their fitness to fly almost a decade before one plunged out of the sky in Afghanistan, killing all 14 servicemen on board.
The father of one of the victims of the crash in 2006 pledged yesterday to take action over the RAF's "neglect" after this newspaper unearthed damning concerns over the condition and maintenance of the aircraft from nearly a decade before his son died.
The confidential Nimrod Airworthiness Review Team (Nart) report, presented to senior RAF officers in 1998, detailed almost 60 "airworthiness concerns" and "airworthiness hazards", including a failure to learn the lessons of previous accidents.
In a stark assessment of safety standards among the RAF's 25 Nimrods, the review declared that "low manning levels, declining experience, failing morale and perceived overstretch" had compromised the fleet's "ability to meet its operational task safely".
It added: "Overall, the Maritime Patrol Aircraft Force is attempting to sustain historical levels of activity with far fewer personnel and a smaller proportion of serviceable ac [aircraft]; ie, there is a large element of continuously trying to get 'a quart out of a pint pot', with all the attendant hazards that such a scenario presents to state ac operations."
However, it has emerged that RAF chiefs at the time dismissed the report's warnings as "uninformed, crew-room level, emotive comment lacking substantive evidence and focus".
Eight years after the warning signs were first raised, Nimrod XV230 exploded in mid-air near Kandahar in September 2006, as the pilot tried to land after reporting a fire in the bomb bay. Subsequent inquiries concluded that the fire was sparked after leaking fuel made contact with a hot air pipe. Crews and engineers reported problems with a number of the planes, which were tasked with flying in Afghanistan and Iraq while fast approaching their out-of-service date.
Graham Knight, whose 25-year-old son Ben died in the XV230 disaster, said the findings would bolster his attempts to bring legal action against the Ministry of Defence (MoD) over its failure to meet its "duty of care" towards the lost service personnel.
He said: "I was aware of the failings of the Nimrods, but I did not know that they had been put so clearly in a report eight years before the XV230 went down. I am shocked and disgusted that the RAF knew about these problems but did nothing about them. Ben always used to tell me that the RAF would not allow its personnel to go up in an unsafe aircraft but he was wrong and I was right."
The official report into the Kandahar disaster referenced the Nart report, saying its concerns "proved to be very prescient" and insisted that they "should not have been dismissed so easily" in 1998. Charles Haddon-Cave QC, who wrote the 2006 inquiry report, said: "It should be noted that many of the same concerns were echoed to me by rank-and-file during my visits to RAF Kinloss 10 years later in 2008. In my view, the Nart concerns and warnings were not sufficiently heeded in the... years leading up to the XV230 accident."
However, the MoD has consistently declined to publish the full details of the Nart report, at one time claiming it had been lost. Following concerted pressure, the document was eventually slipped out into the House of Commons library in the summer recess.
The report, obtained by The Independent on Sunday, itemises 11 airworthiness hazards – "representing current threats to safety and, therefore, requiring urgent attention" – and 47 airworthiness concerns, "of a less serious nature that, nevertheless, merit remedial action as soon as possible". It listed 120 separate recommendations for action by RAF bosses.
The review team raised critical concerns over the inadequate supervision of crews, a reduction in manpower due to cuts, poor servicing manuals and outdated inspection procedures. Their report also warned of the damaging effect of corrosion on the fleet. Among the airworthiness hazards cited was the failure to carry out the recommendations of boards of inquiry into previous accidents.
Mr Haddon-Cave said the failure to heed the Nart team's warnings had had an impact on subsequent failings.
An MoD spokesman said the department had been addressing failings identified by Mr Haddon-Cave, although he could not confirm that the Nart conclusions had been acted on after they were presented in 1998. He said: "The Haddon-Cave review examined the Nimrods' airworthiness and did consider the Nart report. His final report highlighted failings which are being addressed."
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