The following notes of judgments were prepared by the reporters of the All England Law Reports.
Small v Cohen and ors - CA (Neill, Kennedy LJJ), 8 July 1992.
The word 'cause' in RSC Ord 62, r 8(1) bore the meaning given to the word in s 151(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, namely, 'action'. Accordingly, until the conclusion of an action the court had no jurisdiction to make an order for the taxation of the costs of any proceedings.
Robert Powell-Jones (Mulderrig Small, Oldham) for the appellant; John Davies (Berg & Co, Manchester) for the respondents.
R v Lee - CA (Crim Div) (Lloyd LJ, Tudor Evans, Latham JJ), 7 July 1992.
The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) has no jurisdiction to entertain an application under s 39 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 that restrictions be placed on the reporting of proceedings in the crown court.
The words 'any proceedings in any court' in s 39 do not refer to any proceedings anywhere, but to proceedings in the court making the order. A defendant aggrieved by the lifting of reporting restrictions in the crown court should go back to the crown court if there has been a change in circumstances, or otherwise to the Divisional Court by way of judicial review.
Andrew Short, who did not appear below (Registrar of Criminal Appeals) for the appellant; Presiley Baxendale QC (Treasury Solicitor) as amicus curiae.
R v Cambridge Justices, Ex p Peacock - QBD (DC) (Leggatt LJ, Pill J), 6 July 1992.
Justices who refused to hear an application to remove handcuffs from a defendant who had been produced from police custody on the ground that it was a matter entirely for the police had abrogated their responsibility as to how prisoners were to be treated in their court. It was for the justices to decide if a prisoner should be handcuffed or not. No prisoner should be handcuffed unless it could be shown that he was violent or there was a risk of escape.
Justices had to entertain an application from the prosecution for the prosecution to be handcuffed and once such an application had been made there was no need to entertain an application by the defence for the removal of handcuffs except on fresh grounds.
The applicant in person; Richard Calland (Sharpe Pritchard for Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire) for the prosecutor.
European Partners in Capital (Epic) Holdings BV v Goddard & Smith - CA (Scott LJ, Sir Christopher Slade), 2 July 1992.
Cases in which a choice had to be made between different professional opinions in order to establish liability were not in general suitable for summary judgment under RSC Ord 14.
Jonathan Ferris (Jaques & Lewis) for the appellants; Jonathan A Davis (Goodman Derrick & Co) for the respondents.
Halliday v Shoesmith and anor - CA (Stocker, Beldam LJJ), 30 June 1992.
An application, without the consent of counsel for the defendant, to strike out allegations in the defence when the action was about to be tried was one which the judge should approach with the greatest caution and one to which he should accede only in the clearest and most obvious case.
A party to litigation who delayed in making such an application had indicated that he was intending to proceed to trial and had induced the other party to incur the costs of preparing for trial and increase his potential liability for costs. The court should not embark on such an application save in the most exceptional case and with a valid explanation for the lateness of the application.
Michael Nield, who did not appear below (Triggs Turner, Guildford) for the defendant appellant; Michael Soole (Hart Brown & Co, Guildford) for the plaintiff.
Re W and S (minors) - FD (Bracewell J), 8 July 1992.
In appeals pursuant to s 94 of the Children Act 1989, where justices had to provide their findings and reasons for their decision, it was essential that all documents, including notes of evidence, should be provided in legible typescript for the assistance of the High Court.
Daniel Matovu (Seviers, Sheerness) for the appellant; Robin Spon Smith (John Copland & Son, Sheerness) for the respondent.
Walters v Walters - FD (Thorpe J), 2 July 1992.
Rule 8.1 of the Family Proceedings Rules 1991 (SI no 1247) demonstrated that the Family Division judge on hearing an appeal against an ancillary relief order made by the district judge would ordinarily adopt the evidence before the district judge and his conclusions in relation to that evidence and would not ordinarily admit further evidence unless there were good reasons for re- opening the investigation.
However, he was free to substitute his own discretion for that of the district judge's even if he had adopted all the findings of the district judge.
The appellant husband appeared in person; Debra Gold (Steel & Shamash) for the wife.
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Parker - QBD (DC) (Watkins LJ, Tucker J), 6 July 1992.
The Home Secretary, when exercising his discretion to calculate the 'tariff' on a prisoner serving a life sentence for murder, was entitled, even where the jury had indicated that it was convicting on the basis of a spur of the moment killing, to take account of other matters, including the evidence before the jury and the views of the trial judge and the Lord Chief Justices as to tariff.
Unless it could be demonstrated that he had not given proper weight to the jury's findings, the Divisional Court would not interfere.
Jonathan Llewelyn Davies (Russell & Hallmark, Worcester) for the applicant; David Pannick QC (Treasury Solicitor) for the Home Secretary.
In European Partners in Capital (Epic) Holdings BV v Goddard & Smith, Independent case summaries, 13 July 1992, Williams Davies Meltzer were the solicitors for the appellants.Reuse content