Law Report: Councillor is qualified to stand for election: Parker v Yeo. Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Neill, Lord Justice Stuart-Smith and Lord Justice Beldam). 6 October 1992

A councillor's work in his capacity as an elected member of a local council which was performed within the area of the council qualified him to stand as a candidate for re-election to the council.

The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by Raymond Yeo, from the Queen's Bench Divisional Court's decision (The Independent, 14 August 1992), that Mr Yeo was not qualified for election as a councillor to Exeter City Council.

Section 79(1)(c) of the Local Government Act 1972 provides: 'A person shall . . . be qualified to be elected and to be a member of a local authority if he is a British subject . . . and . . . (c) his principal or only place of work . . . has been in that area;' Mr Yeo, who lives outside the Exeter area, was first elected to the city council in 1983. He qualified for election then as he was employed as managing director of a business within the council's area.

In 1990, the business ceased and Mr Yeo retired. He has no other form of employment and devotes his time to his duties as a member of the council. As a councillor he was a member of several committees and working groups. His work as a councillor is mainly performed at the Civic Centre which is within the city council's area.

Earlier this year, he came up for re-election. He relied on his work as a councillor at the Civic Centre as his qualification for election under section 79(1)(c) of the Local Government Act 1972. He was elected a councillor on 7 May 1992.

Dorothy Ann Parker, the unsuccessful candidate, brought a petition in the form of a special case, challenging his election. The Divisional Court held that his work as a councillor did not amount to qualification for election within section 79(1)(c). Mr Yeo appealed.

Richard Price (Penningtons) for Mr Yeo; Gavin Millar (Steel & Shamash) for Mrs Parker; James Lewis (DPP) for the DPP.

LORD JUSTICE STUART- SMITH said that the word work had a wide meaning; it was wider than business or employment. It was accepted by the Divisional Court that in its natural and ordinary meaning, what Mr Yeo did in his capacity as councillor was work and that his place of work was within the relevant area. However, the Divisional Court held that, in its context, it should be construed in a more restrictive sense and, in particular, could not include the function or duties that the candidate was elected to perform.

It was said that the word work was used in contradistinction to the duties which the candidate had performed by virtue of the office he had previously been elected to perform. The section was concerned both with the office and the qualification for it and there was no contradiction other than that and no indication that a particular kind of work performed in the execution of the office was to be excluded.

It was plain that the purpose of the section was to ensure that the candidate had a personal interest in the area. But it was impossible to place so restrictive a definition to the necessary interest as to exclude Mr Yeo.

If an interest in the services and amenities provided by the council was sufficient, Mr Yeo had just as much an interest in those as someone else whose work, whether paid or unpaid, took place in the city and that was none the less so because he was a member of the council that provided them.

There was much force in the submission that the court should give effect to the normal and ordinary use of the word unless an absurd result was reached. There was nothing absurd in such a construction; indeed there might be much to be said for a policy that permitted someone who had devoted much of his time and energy to the service of the council and his constituents being qualified as a candidate on that ground alone.

On behalf of the DPP it was submitted that that result would give an unfair advantage to a previously elected candidate as against an unsuccessful one. There was not much force in that point.

It frequently happened that a 'shadow councillor', that is someone hoping to be elected next time, would do constituency work for the party office in the area. If he did so, there was no reason why he should not equally be qualified, if that was his principal or only place of work, which was a question of fact or degree.

The words should be given their natural and ordinary meaning and there was no warrant for implying a restrictive effect.

The appeal would be allowed.

LORD JUSTICE BELDAM, agreeing, said that there were many councillors who after years of conscientious and valuable service left their normal employment for redundancy or retirement at an age when they could offer the community further service as their principal occupation with all the experience of and knowledge and interest in the locality which they had acquired. Their duties might have required extensive contact with local organisations. Nothing in the Act suggested that Parliament intended specifically to exclude work as a member of the authority. The requirements qualified the candidate 'to be elected and to be a member'. It was difficult to think of any work which would better qualify a candidate for membership than work in the area of the local authority as an elected member.

A person elected with one qualification might apply for re- election with a different qualification acquiring during his membership.

There was no reason either as a matter of construction of the Act, or of policy, to exclude a member seeking re-election from relying on the place of his work as a member, if that was his principal or only place of work. Rather, insofar as policy could assist the court to decide the meaning of the Act, it pointed to the opposite conclusion.

LORD JUSTICE NEILL agreed.