Food-and-mouth report: Outbreak led to panic and confusion in Whitehall

A damning picture of incompetence and confusion among panic-stricken ministers and Whitehall officials emerges from the Anderson report.

It says foot-and-mouth disease spread far wider than it should have because of a sluggish response by Government, which was using out-of-date and inadequate contingency plans. "Neither the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) nor the farming industry was prepared for an outbreak on a large scale," says the report. "The Ministry could not cope with the unprecedented chain of events which allowed the disease to go undetected for weeks.

Iain Anderson added: During the course of the inquiry we were faced with criticism of the Government's policies and actions throughout the epidemic.

"We recognise the desire to see someone blamed and understand the frustration and anger felt by so many.

"However, the nation will not be best served by seeking to blame individuals – rather we should seek to apply the lessons to be learned in a manner that will contribute to changes in collective attitudes and approaches."

But the report will make difficult reading for Nick Brown, the then Agriculture Minister and now Minister for Work, and Jim Scudamore, the Chief Veterinary Officer, who initially took charge of the crisis.

THE GOVERNMENT MACHINE

The Anderson report says the resources of the Government were not mobilised early enough and by early March, "a sense of panic appeared, communications became erratic and orderly processes started to break down. Decision-making became haphazard and messy", especially over the extension of the culling policy.

Although Ministers and veterinary experts realised they were facing a serious situation, "no one in command understood in sufficient detail what was happening on the ground in those early days".

Specifically, it says contingency plans to cope with an outbreak "had gaps and had not been shared widely or rehearsed outside the State Veterinary Service".

Within MAFF, and now the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), the report detected a "culture predisposed to decision-taking by committee and an associated fear of personal risk-taking".

Whitehall should in future maintain vigilance against animal diseases through national and international surveill- ance and prepare a comprehensive contingency plan for coping with another outbreak.

Animal disease policies should be regularly updated, with a report on preparedness every two years, starting next year. A mechanism should be put in place "at the centre of Government" to advise the Prime Minister in such cases and trigger a wider response.

SPEED OF ACTION

The first responses to early cases were not fast enough or effectively co-ordinated. "The paramount importance of speed, and especially the rapid slaughter of infected animals, was not given overriding priority early on". DEFRA should look at ways of rapidly increasing staffing at time of crisis, including local volunteers.

INFORMATION

The quality of information held by MAFF was criticised. "[Its] ability to record and analyse data about the disease was still largely based on a patchwork of unconnected systems operated by individual regions, some of which used only paper records. It calls for DEFRA to "lay out milestones for investment... for improved management info-rmation systems".

SLAUGHTER & DISPOSAL

Mass pyres and huge burial sites remain "vivid images of the 2001 epidemic". The strategy should not be used again, says the report, and the Government should revise its slaughter policy and consult local communities.

CULLING

Changes to the culling policy were introduced at short notice and "often poorly communicated". Slaughtering apparently healthy animals within 3km (1.8 miles) of infected premises became "very unpopular".

FOOTPATHS

The closure of footpaths, sending out the message the countryside was shut for business, was a "mistake". It had not considered the impact on tourism or the rural economy. There was no straightforward mechanism for reopening them.

VACCINATION

Vaccination should be considered in any future outbreak, despite problems over the science, the opposition of farmers and consumer reaction.

FARMING PRACTICES

The Government is recommended to develop a livestock tracing system, using electronic tagging.

The ban on left-overs from restaurants – a possible cause of last year's outbreak – should remain in place. Those in the industry should "do everything in their power to promote good practice". Agricultural colleges should include compulsory tuition in biosecurity.

VETERINARY MATTERS

The State Veterinary Service, which worked "in isolation", had warned before the outbreak about its inability to cope with an epidemic, but, "these concerns were not relayed to Ministers".

A national network of "flying squad" teams from the State Veterinary Service capable of responding to an early alert is recommended. As many functions as possible of the Service should be conducted in regional centres rather than London.

ROLE OF MILITARY

The arrival of the army to cope with the crisis was "a positive step-change in the management of the disease". Anderson's report also says it is a "compelling question to which there is no obvious answer" as to why the military was not brought in earlier.

It recommends "the military be consulted at the earliest appropriate opportunity to provide advice and consider the nature of possible support".

The Government should consider setting up a national volunteer reserve able to respond to similar outbreaks.

How they fared

NICK BROWN

As Minister for Agriculture, his department was unprepared for the scale of outbreak. Criticised for saying on 11 March he was "absolutely certain" the disease was under control. The report said "his comments ... contributed to the loss of trust".

TONY BLAIR

Mr Anderson says that Blair's personal intervention in taking charge of the crisis was "pivotal" in managing it. He dismissed suggestions that policy was manipulated by the Prime Minister to fit with general election plans.

JIM SCUDAMORE

The Chief Veterinary Officer recognised seriousness of situation but no one in command understood in detail what was happening on the ground. Scudamore was "fairly overwhelmed" at the height of the crisis, but will have learned a "massive amount".

BEN GILL

The National Farmers' Union, of which Mr Gill is president, strongly opposed vaccination, but Mr Anderson urges that vaccination be considered in future foot-and-mouth policy. Mr Anderson has said that he regretted the union's "outspoken" opposition.