Navy mistakes are blamed for capture of hostages by Iran

The capture of British sailors and marines by Iran in the Gulf was the result of a series of mistakes by the Navy, and the decision to let the freed hostages sell their story to the press was a "collective failure of judgement" by the Ministry of Defence, two official inquiries have concluded.

The selling of stories by armed forces personnel would be banned and reforms implemented to prevent a recurrence of the incident which led to a heated diplomatic confrontation between London and Tehran, the Defence Secretary, Des Browne, said. The damning reports expose Royal Navy failings in many key areas, in appreciating the threat posed by the Iranians, in dealing with intelligence, and in decision-making leading up to the crisis. The handling of the media by the MoD was marked by disorganisation which allowed the auction of the hostages' story to newspapers and broadcasters, causing "anger and concern" among the public.

One of the reports, by former Royal Marines Lieutenant-General Sir Rob Fulton into the seizure of the naval party remains classified and will not be published for "operational reasons", said the Government. No individuals have been named as culpable for the mistakes, and no disciplinary action will be taken.

Denying that the report was a whitewash, Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, the head of the Royal Navy, said that some personnel could still face "appropriate administrative action". "People who need to be given any messages will be given the messages," he said.

Admiral Band acknowledged that "bad calls were made and operational awareness was found wanting". He accepted that the Navy's reputation had been "dented" but maintained that it would recover. "The events of 23 March were one bad day in our proud 100-year history. I can assure the British people that I will personally ensure the recommendations of this report are fully implemented."

Mr Browne said he accepted all the recommendations and stressed that General Fulton's report had found the capture of the naval party was not the result of a lack of equipment or resources, including helicopter cover, and HMS Cornwall, the ship from which the boarding party operated, was fit for purpose.

He continued: "General Fulton's conclusions suggest that there is no case for disciplinary action against any of the individuals involved. But this report does emphasise that many of those individuals could have done more to prevent what happened. In that respect it identifies some failings, both collective and individual, which the Navy's chain of command will deal with."

The second report, which dealt with the handling of the media by the MoD, was headed by Tony Hall, a former BBC director of news and present head of the Royal Opera House; Patrick Turner, a senior MoD civil servant, and Major-General Andrew Stewart, the assistant chief of defence staff. Mr Hall said that, extraordinarily, he could not find anyone who admitted taking the decision to allow the returned detainees to sell their story.

He could find, he said, "not one single person in position who took the decision to authorise payment or one clear occasion when that decision was made. This was a collective failure of judgement or abstention from judgement."

What has to be done

The action plan by Royal Marines Lieutenant-General Sir Rob Fulton:

* Need for improvement in the handling of intelligence, in communications, in doctrine, and in both individual and collective training.

* Boarding parties should no longer be made up of composite personnel but must be specialist teams.

* More should be learnt "from the experience of other nations operating in the area" (meaning the US) and better sharing of information.

Tony Hall's recommendations for media relations:

* Ministry of Defence ban on selling of stories by military and civilian personnel employed by the armed forces.

* The Ministry of Defence press office should be strengthened both in terms of numbers and expertise.

* There should be a rebuilding of trust between the MoD and the media.