The links between the ISI and the Taliban were brought into sharp focus yesterday – the day before Barack Obama announces his strategy for countering militants in both countries – in leaked reports to two US newspapers.
The reports, in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal, once again highlight the potential risks from Pakistan's ties to the Taliban, which could derail American policy. The new strategy has been carefully co-ordinated with Islamabad.
Asserting that both Pakistan's civilian government and military leaders lack the capability and desire to cut the ties with militants, anonymous US officials said the ISI was providing arms, money and support to Taliban fighters in southern Afghanistan, where US and British troops are stationed.
It has long been alleged that some within Pakistan's main spy agency have retained links to the Taliban, which they helped to establish in the 1990s. Last year, the head of the CIA flew to Islamabad to present evidence that he claimed showed ISI elements were involved in a deadly bomb attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul.
But officials in Washington now say that, according to human intelligence and electronic intercepts, the ISI, through its "S Wing" which conducts deals with operations in Afghanistan, is supporting more militant networks than was previously thought, including Lashkar-e-Toiba, which was blamed for last year's attacks in Mumbai.
At times, ISI agents have even rounded up new recruits for the Afghan battlefields from Muslim religious schools inside Pakistan. The accusations in the New York Times also send a clear message that the Obama administration believes the civilian government of President Asif Ali Zardari, and the army chief General Ashfaq Kayani, have failed in their undertakings to break such links. Last year, Mr Zardari promised that the ISI would be "handled" and he tried to place it under civilian control, only for the plan to be rejected by the military. Mr Kayani, meanwhile, replaced the head of the agency in a purported shake-up.
"What [the US is] trying to do is put a lot of pressure on Pakistan and saying, 'you have to be categorical in your commitment to the war on terror'," said Talat Masood, a former Pakistani general who is now a military analyst. "They have grave doubts about that commitment, as they are many forces who are still active and are inimical to US interests. This doubt has been there all along, despite the fact that General Kayani and Lieutenant-General Shuja Pasha, the head of the ISI, enjoy good relations with the US military leadership. In spite of this confidence, [it appears] they think there are rogue elements in the ISI or there is still a dual policy at work."
Historically, the ISI maintained links with the Taliban for "strategic depth" and to exert control in Afghanistan, where Pakistan fears the influence of India. Delhi has always made clear it believes the ISI has never cut those links.
President Obama is promoting a regional strategy for Afghanistan, having named Richard Holbrooke, a former ambassador, to be his envoy for the "AfPak" region, as the two countries are known in Washington jargon. He is also reaching out to Iran, which has influence in Afghanistan.
Mr Obama's nominee to be the next US ambassador to Kabul, Lieutenant-General Karl Eikenberry, said yesterday that success in both Afghanistan and neighbouring Pakistan was vital to protect America's national security. "We don't have an unlimited amount of time here," the officer told the Senate foreign relations committee at his confirmation hearing. "Time is not necessarily with us unless we develop a more, and are able to implement a more, effective strategy."
However, Pakistan has its own concerns about US policy and strongly opposes attacks on Islamic militants by pilotless Predator drone aircraft inside Pakistan.
"As we have been saying, these attacks are counter-productive and we hope that, as a result of the policy review in Washington, we would have some positive outcome," said Abdul Basit, a spokesman for the foreign ministry in Islamabad.
Pakistan believes the sole measure of success of America's strategy lies with public opinion in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The time frame for the new policy is therefore seen as critical. Some progress must be shown in the first year, officials say, while more meaningful achievements should take between three and five years.
Some in Pakistan even hold up as a model for Afghanistan a truce between the Taliban and Pakistani authorities in the Swat valley, in the troubled North-West Frontier Province along the Afghan border. Under a deal which gave concessions to Taliban militants, the government allowed the establishment of sharia law in return for the ceasefire. But there are fears that the arrangement has only strengthened the Taliban and effectively conceded the area as a Taliban safe haven which beyond of government control.
The Pakistani military aims to separate the non-violent extremists from those who carry out attacks, and denies suggestions that the measure is tantamount to appeasement.
Furthermore, in its pursuit of the Taliban commander, Baitullah Mehsud, and his allies in the Bajaur tribal area and the Swat valley, the Pakistan army has not disturbed militants such as Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Mullah Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, who is believed to be hiding in the Pakistani city of Quetta.
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