Myth of Iraqi military strength exploded

Saddam Hussein, commander-in-chief of the Iraqi army, has generally demonstrated very poor military judgement, which helps to explain how he lost his grip on power so rapidly after the US-led invasion.

Crucially, as in the 1991 Gulf War, most Iraqi soldiers did not fight in this war. They saw defeat was inevitable against a vastly superior enemy and they did not want to die uselessly for President Saddam.

After the Gulf War President Saddam took two initiatives: he gave much more power over the army to Baath party militants and the Fedayeen Saddam, a half-trained militia, to make sure that fear of instant punishment would prevent the mass desertions of 1991.

He also created the Special Republican Guard under his second son, Qusay, which was drawn from tribes allied to himself. This supplemented the Republican Guard, which was vastly expanded in 1986 to form the main military force. The siphoning off of resources to these supposedly elite forces was deeply demoralising for the rest of the army, who considered themselves cannon fodder.

Signs of demoralisation were everywhere. No big bridges over the Euphrates or the Tigris were blown up to delay Allied forces. Soldiers stayed with their units because of fear of death squads. And in the end neither the Fedayeen nor the many intelligence and security services could get the soldiers to fight in a hopeless cause.

Nor were the Fedayeen or the Baath party militia seriously trained to fight as guerrillas themselves. They could make pinprick attacks but Anglo-American casualties, with less than 130 dead, shows that they were ultimately ineffective.

On paper, President Saddam's strategy for this war had seemed sensible. He boasted that he would withdraw into the cities, where the Allies would not dare to use their air power. But he never quite carried out this plan. Baghdad was never fortified. The Republican Guard divisions were left out in the plains around the capital to be hit by American air power.

The surprise of the campaign was that the 70,000-strong Republican Guard and the 15,000 Special Republican Guards, the well-equipped and well-paid praetorian guard of the regime, appear to have evaporated. Certainly, there was not even a serious attempt by President Saddam to stage a last stand in Baghdad fighting house to house.

The most obvious reason was the total US control of the air and the ability to bomb the Republican Guard's trenches. There was always less to Iraq's armed forces than met the eye. They failed in their invasion of Iran in 1980, only rallied thanks to huge support from the US after 1982 and failed dismally again in Kuwait in 1991.

Exaggeration of Iraq's strength came from contradictory sources: Iraqi propaganda extolling its military prowess and the systematic demonisation of Iraq as a threat to its neighbours and the world by President Bush and Tony Blair to justify the present invasion.

It never made sense. Much Iraqi equipment was destroyed in the first Gulf War. President Saddam had neither the money nor the ability, thanks to sanctions, to re-equip the army. The army was also sectarian. While 80 per cent of the army is Shia, they make up only 20 per cent of the officers, who are predominantly Sunni Muslim.

But President Saddam's greatest military and political weakness was the unpopularity of his regime. Effective guerrilla warfare or withstanding a siege requires thousands of young men willing to fight and die without a gun pressed to their back. Saddam Hussein never had this type of support.

The writer is the co-author, with Andrew Cockburn, of 'Saddam Hussein: An American Obsession'.