Ali Ansari: Don't feed the Anglophobes

One of the most striking aspects of the continuing crisis between Britain and Iran has been the shrill condemnation of the Foreign Office at its failure to be "tough enough" on those "cunning Persians", who only understand the language of force. Hawkish commentators - generously encouraged by their supporters in the US - in their rush to condemn Margaret Beckett clearly lament the decline of gunboat diplomacy, and demand to know the whereabouts of today's Palmerstons and Curzons.

In decrying the passing of Empire, such commentators share a curious parallel universe with their hardline Iranian counterparts, who similarly ponder the passing of their own imperial age and wonder aloud why Iranians should continue to suffer the impertinence of "perfidious Albion". Nostalgia tends to rely on a highly selective reading of history, and in this case both sides are guilty. Britain's relationship with Iran is a profoundly historical one, replete with myths that are a minefield for the ignorant.

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Lord Curzon's legacy would be a good place to start. Admired and condemned in almost equal measure, depending on one's political perspective, Curzon's encounter with Iran was a good deal more nuanced than either side might care to admit. Often as critical of British policy towards Iran as he was of Iranian idiosyncrasies, as far as Curzon was concerned, British policy towards Iran had to be strategic, coherent, and above all, historically grounded. This, rather than any ascribed bombastic imperialism, is Curzon's real legacy as a great statesman. If his compatriots could criticise him at all, it was for the overt sympathy he often showed to Iran. Iranians might justifiably criticise his excessive paternalism. Curzon was not the first - nor indeed the last - British statesman to form an empathy with Iran.

Formal and systematic contact between Britain and Iran, it should be remembered, stretch back 400 years. Indeed, in those days, the empathy could be so strong that an Englishman - Sir Anthony Sherley - proudly described himself as the "Persian Ambassador" to the courts of Europe, in full Persian costume and regalia. Trade and political advantage drove British policy in the first two centuries of contact, enhanced by cultural exchanges and literary developments. It was not however until the development of the British Empire in India, by the end of the 18th century, that Britain and Iran effectively became neighbours, and the intimacy of the relationship grew. British India ensured that henceforth there would be conflicting interests, and that British interest in Iran became a strategic imperative.

Caught between the competing Russian and British empires, Iran's statesmen stubbornly, if ineffectively, sought to stem their own imperial decline. But where Russia brought brute force, Britain brought guile and Britain's ability to engage in manipulation soon became part of Iranian political folklore. Britain's undeniable success in making Iranians believe in her political omnipotence has proved something of a double-edged sword ever since.

It is this legacy that determines Anglo-Iranian relations to this day. Now, as in the 19th century, Britain finds herself a neighbour of Iran and Iranian politicians again fear Britain's motives - seeing, in their political difficulties, her omnipresent hand. Misguided policies that call for the encouragement of ethnic discontent and self-determination - a neo-con favourite - simply fuel the paranoia. The sudden emergence, for instance, of lobby groups seeking autonomy and independence for Ahwazi Arabs bring to Iranian minds British attempts a century ago at encouraging such sentiments in Iran's oil rich south-west, so as to better facilitate the security of British oil interests.

This mutual exaggeration of the other's power underpins the current crisis, and explains the Iranian readiness to believe that the British must have been up to no good. Perfidious Albion is an easy sell in Iran, which is exactly why hysteria and bombast is contrary to British interests. We should resist the temptation to compound an image that bears little relation to reality, at home or abroad. British power in Iran was never as extensive as Iranians fear, or British hubris tended to project. The truth was that British priorities lay elsewhere, in India, and now in Iraq. Curzon understood this paradox. Other priorities often meant that Iran was neglected; yet the centrality of Iran to the geopolitics of the region necessitated a profound understanding and a strategic vision.

Likewise, the current seizure of British personnel cannot be understood outside this particular history, or indeed the liberal (imperial) project that has resulted in the occupation of Iraq. The soldiers of the Iran's Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), the driving force in the current crisis, are raised on a steady doctrine of Anglophobia, reinforced by a conviction that the revolution has empowered Iranians to respond forcefully against those who have harmed it in the past. There are many among this group who resolutely believe that America is a mere pawn in the hands of the British - that Bush is very much Blair's poodle - and that the real target for Iranian ire should have been, and should be, Britain and not the US.

There are still others, including President Ahmadinejad, who believe the renewal of revolutionary values requires a revival of the ideology of confrontation: permanent revolution requires permanent confrontation. Consequently, Britain needs to handle the situation with care, and not take the bait, as arguably the Israelis did in Lebanon last summer. It may be galling to our armchair generals, but sometimes the answer is not the most obvious reaction that comes to mind. As Curzon knew all too well, Iran does not respond to soundbite diplomacy, and ultimately it will be British interests that suffer. Time to relearn the lessons of the past.

Dr Ali Ansari is director of the Institute for Iranian Studies, University of St Andrews, and author of 'Confronting Iran'