Steve Richards: If this is Tony Blair's exit strategy for Iraq, it is a very confused and uncertain one

In the Commons yesterday, Tony Blair announced that 1,600 troops would be leaving Basra soon, but the majority would still remain. He insisted that this did not mark a rigid timetable for withdrawal. Instead he argued in a Blairite phrase that sounded clearer than it was, that British troops would not leave while they were needed, and would not stay longer than necessary. Which soldier would stay when they were not needed and seek to remain when it was unnecessary?

The statement was marked throughout by a similar ambiguous evasiveness. Was the announcement a cause for modest relief or the start of another unpredictably bleak phase in the conflict? Mr Blair stated that those troops staying in Basra were being assigned roles that were different. Even so, the duties sounded almost as dangerous.

According to Mr Blair, British soldiers would train Iraqi troops, secure the Iraq/Iran border and be there "when called upon", which is an ominously vague remit. Presumably they could be called upon often. Speaking with his characteristic elusive candour, Mr Blair argued that a further withdrawal of troops would depend on the British government, the Iraqi authorities and "those that we are fighting", again a fairly combustible and unreliable combination on which to plan for the future .

The statement of oscillating mood echoed some of those that were made in advance of the war. Mr Blair supported the conflict for a variety of complex reasons that changed from time to time. As far as he was concerned, the causes included the removal of Saddam's weapons, regime change, a desire to move the Bush administration away from isolationism, a fear of breaking away from the US and a hope of establishing peace in the Middle East. Nothing was very clear at the beginning.

The exit is equally foggy. Now Britain starts to leave Basra, although the city remains insecure on many fronts. Mr Blair pointed to improvements, although he acknowledged that troops were constantly under fire and did not challenge David Cameron when the Tory leader spoke of the bleak deterioration in Basra over the last three years.

Are the much fired-upon soldiers going because they are the main source of tension? Are they moving out because Basra has improved? Or are they heading home because the city has deteriorated while they were there? Like much in relation to Britain's involvement in Iraq, clarity was not the strong point of yesterday's statement.

There were other oddities. Mr Blair praised the Baker report published at the end of last year and claimed that it had informed the latest strategy of the Bush administration. Yet there is no tangible sign that it has done so, as the US send more troops to Baghdad and refuse to engage with Iran or Syria.

Mr Blair also deployed a familiar lawyer's sleight of hand. Several times and with apparent passion he proclaimed that we "should not apologise for our values". No one is calling for such an apology. As the Lib Dem leader, Ming Campbell, pointed out no one wants an apology for values, but "we must take responsibility for the consequences of our actions", a different matter.

Indeed the whole debate about whether Mr Blair should apologise is trite and banal, as if multi-layered complexities in the build up and aftermath of war can be reduced to the single word "sorry". Such a response would be neither cathartic nor appropriate. But Mr Blair is being equally simplistic and disingenuous in his implication that opponents of the war support the "values" of the terrorists.

Strangest of all in his passionate defence of the war, Mr Blair inadvertently made the case against it. He acknowledged that Iraq had been subject to "a sickening level of carnage". He explained in some detail that Shia militant groups, Sunnis, former Saddamists and al-Qa'ida were fighting it out, especially in Baghdad. They had different aims and ideologies, but were linked by the common aim of preventing democracy.

Having outlined the carnage and the internal conflicts, Mr Blair proceeded to explain the attempts at progress, the training and equipment of Iraqi forces and police, which he admitted was hampered by corruption and sectarianism, and the limited economic regeneration. He suggested that "in normal circumstances the progress would be remarkable". Instead, Iraq faced what he called "an orgy of terrorism".

But this is precisely what informed opponents of the war warned would happen. Mr Blair's graphic and honest depiction of internal strife echoes the prophecies made in advance of the war that he dismissed at the time. Even British intelligence, otherwise wholly unreliable, warned that the war would heighten the risk of terrorism. In the US, there were detailed papers published about the threat of civil war in the event of an invasion.

One Blair ally talks now of the "Sebrenica generation", those that formed views about the benefits of military intervention based on the Balkans. Yet the war in Iraq has created divisions that make those in the former Yugoslavia seem relatively straightforward. The conflict has had precisely the opposite impact, creating division rather than healing it. Yesterday Mr Blair acknowledged in detail those appalling internal tensions.

Beyond this, as the former Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind pointed out, Mr Blair is in denial. The Prime Minister argued repeatedly yesterday that "the terrorists were to blame for the terror", an argument of adolescent simplicity that ignores the wider context entirely. In essence Mr Blair refuses still to accept that the US and Britain shaped the terrain on which the terrorists flourish and which makes an exit strategy so problematic.

What is changing more quickly than the role of British troops is the dynamics of domestic political debate. Before the war, the Conservatives were gung-ho, a key element in the political equation at the time. Yesterday Mr Cameron looked to strategies that go beyond military force, stressing the importance of diplomacy and broad-based alliances. He also argued that establishing democracy takes time.

Like the Democrats in the US, Mr Cameron and his foreign affairs spokesman, William Hague, move from a position of slavish support for the conflict to a more intelligent position. Gordon Brown will face more subtle opposition in relation to Iraq, the US and the Middle East, an opportunity for him and also a potential trap.

In Iraq, the dynamics are changing less speedily. Some British troops are leaving, but many remain to accomplish daunting tasks. The terrorists continue to cause carnage. Neighbouring states flex newly developed muscles. In spite of Mr Blair's good intentions and unstinting effort, peace between Israel and Palestine remains elusive. In advance, some billed yesterday's statement as the beginning of the end. It was not. Instead the prime ministerial words marked another stumble in the dark.

s.richards@independent.co.uk

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