Christopher Bellamy: Why there are some deadly drawbacks to smashing the enemy's command

Wars are won by shattering the morale, cohesion and military command and control of the opposition; by physically smashing them, terrifying them or simply making the command structure incapable of passing orders down.

The ultimate outcome of the US 3rd Division's drive into Baghdad now hardly looks in doubt. Whatever their original intention, it looks as if the US troops who drove to the west bank of the Tigris yesterday morning intend to stay, and attention is switching to Saddam Hussein's home turf around Tikrit.

So where are the Iraqi political leadership and their military command system? Are they shattered, as the Allies hope they are, or can they come back? And how has the US assault targeted the brain of the Iraqi regime?

One problem with smashing enemy command and control is that if he cannot give orders, he cannot easily tell his people to surrender. The message, once given, should get home quickly to regular troops. But the cellular structure adopted by irregular forces will not necessarily respond so well. Or even at all.

The regular Iraqi armed forces and Republican Guard seem to have got the Allied message already. The Iraqi Army, still a formidable force on paper, has virtually disappeared. So have the six Republican Guard divisions (10,000 to 12,000 men each), including three reportedly defending the capital. The four Special Republican Guard Brigades, totalling 20,000 troops, designed to defend President Saddam, have hardly made an appearance. Most of the opposition has come, ironically and unexpectedly, from the Fedayeen militia, some of whom, it appears from initial interrogation reports, are not Iraqi at all, but foreign "volunteers".

The US military seems to have completely failed to factor these Fedayeen into the war game. A US study into Joint Urban Operations led by a senior US general last summer, a summary of which was posted on the internet (http://slate.msn.com/id/2081098/), reportedly set out seven options for the defeat of the Iraqi leadership and dislocation of command and control, focusing on Baghdad. The first three – "isolation siege", "remote strike" or "rubbleizing", and "ground assault, frontal", all of which would entail heavy US military or Iraqi civilian casualties – are no longer options. The final US plan, which is still evolving, appears to be a combination of the last four.

The first of these is "nodal isolation" – using air forces and ground troops to "isolate" command centres and focal points in the city by separating the regime from the civilian population. American and British forces have both been trying to do this. However, this option appears not to have recognised the presence of irregular and paramilitary units such as the Fedayeen.

The next was "nodal capture" – seizing the command and communications centres. American forces were clearly trying to do this yesterday, and with considerable success. This option has the advantage of leaving the governmental infrastructure intact, for takeover and use in the post-Saddam administration.

The third was "segment and capture". In this modified version of "ground assault, frontal", US forces would target specific neighbourhoods most likely to welcome them.

The final option named was "soft point capture and expansion". This involves seizing "unprotected city segments" where military opposition was thought to be weak. These bridgeheads would then be expanded into the most contested parts of the urban area.

First thing yesterday morning the latest assault into Baghdad was described as an "armoured raid". A couple of hours later, it was clear the US troops intended to stay if they could. The seizure of presidential palaces and ministries may look symbolic, but there is real military value to this as well. The Allies are looking for evidence of weapons of mass destruction, to be sure, but they are also looking for evidence of where the Iraqi leadership has gone to.

Physical destruction and intelligence combine to produce irresistible moral pressure. This leads to "tipping", when resistance just crumbles, a phrase first widely used in Afghanistan. We may be there.

Christopher Bellamy is professor of military science and doctrine at Cranfield University