Fergal Keane: We must turn Afghanistan's warlords into peacelords

'There are so many interests in the region that peacemaking is like playing hopscotch in a minefield'

The Taliban are running, and Osama bin Laden is running out of room to hide. Good riddance and good news if the aims of the "war on terror" are about driving the fundamentalists out of Kabul and wiping out the physical presence of al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan. But the muted reaction (and the private tremors of panic) in Western capitals reflects the dawning of a fearful reality: we no longer control the war.

The accepted wisdom was that bombing would weaken, but not shatter, the Taliban lines. It would go on weakening them until the US-led coalition was in a position to launch a ground offensive in the spring. But the B52 and its "daisy cutter" bombs proved a terror too great for the Taliban. Given a choice between instant martyrdom and living to fight another day, most abandoned their positions and ran.

Having altered the military balance and opened the road to Kabul for the Northern Alliance, the coalition has now come face to face with the prospect of powerlessness. The UN and sundry others are dispatching envoys to Kabul, but it is the Northern Alliance that holds the aces. In war, territory is everything and the Alliance is swiftly rolling up as much as it can. It has made all kinds of promises about setting up a broad-based government. It has promised to co-operate with the West.

Perhaps all that is true. But we are not dealing with a unified command or a disciplined army. The alliance has some decent commanders, but many are desperados, killers and drug-runners. To use an American colloquialism, they are "bad sons of bitches". Now they happen to be our sons of bitches.

The West's new ally, Vladimir Putin, has been giving them arms and uniforms, and coalition military advisers have been training their forces. We are involved up to our necks with these characters, but we shouldn't expect any gratitude. The alliance will take what it needs and act according to its own interests.

Yes, the Alliance's Tajik element shares the coalition's hatred for Mr bin Laden – not because of the Twin Towers, but because an al-Qa'ida squad murdered its leader, Ahmed Shah Masood. And all factions are far more concerned with grabbing power and territory than with pursuing a war on terror. They co-operate insomuch as it suits their interests and are capable of turning against the coalition at any time. That is the oldest lesson of Afghanistan, and one the coalition forgets at its peril.

The first question one is tempted to ask is: why was there no plan to deal with this eventuality? Well, there was a plan. And from the moment of its inception it was doomed to failure. A newly unified Afghanistan would be ruled by a broad-based government under the nominal control of the ailing exiled king, Mohammed Zahir Shah. But the king has proved a reluctant partner, not least because he understands too well the treacherous currents of Afghan politics. He clearly feels that a return to Kabul is a prelude to the long drop, and it is hard to blame him.

There are so many competing interests that peacemaking is like playing hop scotch in a minefield. The Pakistanis, Indians, Iranians and the border states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, not to mention the Russians, all have very different agendas. One can't help feeling that they look at the West and snicker up their sleeves. We march forth with bold rhetoric and passionate declarations, oblivious to the darker whisperings and the words of triple meaning that form the true language of Afghanistan.

The coalition set out to teach the fundamentalists a salutary lesson, but it is in danger of becoming a victim of its own success. The victory on the battlefield has created a political vacuum in which all kinds of old scores may be settled and dangerous alliances can take root.

Yet it would be wrong to imply that the coalition has no power to effect change in Afghanistan. Neither Mr Bush nor Mr Blair would wish to contemplate applying military pressure on the Northern Alliance now, but the sight of those B52 strikes will have impressed Alliance leaders, who also know there would be little hope of financial assistance for a new government if the Alliance returned to its old ways.

But how does the international community get to the point where a broad-based government can operate? The West has taken responsibility for the future of Afghanistan but risks being denounced even by Islamic moderates if it sends in its own troops and administrators. Sooner or later the soldiers of Britain and America would find themselves targeted, and a long and bloody occupation would eventually turn Western public opinion against the war.

The answer might be found in an unusual combination of factors: Arab soldiers, Western money and intelligence, and administrators with strong credentials in the Islamic world. Let us take the final proposition first. For example, why not ask somebody of the status of Mohammed Sacirbey or Haris Siladjic (the former Bosnian foreign minister and prime minister respectively) to head an interim UN administration in Kabul? Either man would prove more acceptable to the mass of Afghans, and less amenable to local pressures, than the king. The Bosnians know more about civil conflict than most, and both men are widely respected in the Islamic world. But they also come from a secular and tolerant tradition and, crucially, are familiar with the corridors of power in Washington and New York.

As for peacekeeping troops, the UN security council must realise that, without blue helmets, Afghanistan hasn't a chance of achieving stability. Left to their own devices, the local warlords will eventually go back to fighting. The soldiers would have to be drawn from countries such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Turkey, with massive financial, logistical and intelligence support from America and the European Union. The force needs to be large, heavily armed and with a robust mandate. Coalition air power, based outside Afghanistan, would be a key component in its success.

The immediate task would be to train multi-ethnic military and police forces and disband the private armies that have brought ruin to Afghanistan. That would run the risk of a violent confrontation with warlords such as General Dostum. But a carefully calibrated combination of carrot (in the form of a share in political power) and stick (allied air power and peacekeepers' tanks) might convince the warlords that they have more to gain from peace than war.

None of this promises explicitly a solution to the problem of what to do about the Taliban. The answer to that problem might come in the next few days and depends on the fate of Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban leader, and Mr bin Laden. But it isn't too much to hope that at least some of the young men who fled from the trenches north of Kabul might see the sanity in supporting a more moderate Pashtun leadership.

I am aware of the danger of clutching at straws and striving for optimism in a most perilous situation. But Afghanistan need not become a training ground for the next generation of terrorists and warlords if there is the will to act decisively. Having driven an odious regime from power, we are now faced with a solemn choice. Taking any action in Afghanistan is dangerous, but putting our faith in the good intentions of the warlords would be madness.

The writer is a BBC Special Correspondent