Michael Boyce: We must win hearts and minds as well as battles

Taken from a speech by the Chief of the Defence Staff to the Royal United Services Institute, London

As background, it would be as well to give you an idea of how current strategic thinking has been affected by the fallout from 11 September, Operation Veritas (the UK contribution), and Enduring Freedom. From the outset, the United Kingdom, in addition to diplomatic, financial, humanitarian and political contributions, has provided military support – nuclear attack submarines equipped with Tomahawk missiles, tanker, reconnaissance and other support aircraft and the use of Diego Garcia. This support has played an important role

But we should be careful – the rapidly unfolding events on the ground that led to the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Kabul, Jalalabad, Konduz and Kandahar give the appearance of success. Media and politicians focus on maps on the wall showing the inroads made by the Northern Alliance and other opposition forces. But the ground truth can be very much different. The riot, or counter-attack (depending on your viewpoint), at Mazar-i-Sharif shows just how tenuous the situation is.

Simple victory over the Taliban is not the end-state we seek. We must continue to focus on the enemy rather than on the ground taken; and we must be doubly careful not to identify our enemy just in the human form of Osama bin Laden – this is not a hi-tech 21st-century posse in the new Wild West. The immediate enemy is al-Qa'ida with its cells around the world, and its current capability.

Through operations in Afghanistan we may – indeed, we trust we will – disrupt and deter al-Qa'ida from prosecuting its medium- and long-term terrorist programme; but in the short term it remains a fielded, resourced, dedicated and essentially autonomous terrorist force, quite capable of atrocity on a comparable scale to what happened at the World Trade Centre and Pentagon. And we should contemplate what might be the effect of such another attack – especially on coalition perceptions and heightened concerns on the most appropriate use for military force against terrorism.

Firstly, another attack could cause wobbles, playing to the "if only we hadn't responded militarily" lobby – in effect capitulating to terror; or, secondly, the desire to use greater force with less constraint, less distinction and less proportionality – something that strikes at the acceptable laws of armed conflict and exposes our strategic centre of gravity (our will) by radicalising the opinion of the Islamic world in favour of al-Qa'ida.

It will not be either/or, for you can be sure some states will wobble and others will harden their resolve. These stances strike at the coalition's will and cohesion – which is why the US is considering "agile partnerships".

So where does that leave us with Afghanistan? The world cannot afford non-states, black-hole states or failed states, because such states breed terrorism. Therefore we have to attack the causes, not the symptoms, of terrorism. Both the UK and US wish to promote regional stability, but our perspectives of global and regional stability have been distorted by the focus on fighting terrorism. We have to consider whether we wish to follow the US's single-minded aim to finish Osama bin Laden and al-Qa'ida or to involve ourselves in creating the conditions for nation-building or reconstruction as well.

The US sees national assistance for Afghanistan as a general long-term, rather than short-term, goal, but it is clear that they recognise the UK's particular strengths in facilitating the nation-building process and increasingly favour our lead in that area. Without being cynical, our experience in Malaya and Northern Ireland teaches us that concentrating on the hearts-and-minds side of the campaign enables us to gain information, to isolate the terrorist and to strike at him. This is an approach that has proved successful in counter-terrorist campaigns the world over – and it may be the approach that is needed now.