Mr Putin was right to end the siege, but let him be honest about the mistakes

It is unreasonable to be too critical, with the advantage of hindsight, of the decision taken by Vladimir Putin, the Russian President, to end the siege at the Moscow theatre.

With the hostage-takers plainly sincere in their willingness to die, it was obvious that the prospect of the siege ending peacefully was minimal.

It was essential both that attempts were made to negotiate with the Chechen terrorists and that preparations were made to storm the building. But the negotiations were always an unpromising route. The demands of the hostage-takers were an end to the war in Chechnya and full independence for their homeland.

Those may be legitimate objectives – indeed, a Russian willingness to discuss them is needed to stifle terrorism at source – but they cannot be secured by terrorism. Even if the Russians had been prepared to concede them, it must be doubted whether any agreement could have been quickly reached which would have satisfied the suicidal fanatics who had taken over the theatre.

It was, therefore, not so much a question of whether to send in the special forces, but when and how. And while it will not assuage the grief of the relatives of those hostages who died, the outcome was better than it might have been, in that most of the hostages survived.

The question of whether using the mystery gas to knock out hostage-takers and hostages alike was the right tactic or not is therefore secondary. But the question is important, not least because of the lessons which could be learnt for dealing with similar situations.

While it may be a mistake to lump together all forms of terrorism when it comes to dealing with their causes – with which the "war against terrorism" should ultimately be concerned – when it comes to how to handle hostage-taking situations, governments around the world can learn much from each other. After all, although the spread of suicidal terrorism has changed the balance, one of the most effective deterrents to hostage-taking remains the high probability of death for would-be captors.

On this count the conduct of the Russian authorities in withholding information should be censured. With the same secrecy and paranoia they displayed at the time of the underwater accident on the Kursk nuclear submarine, the Russians have refused to identify the gas used in the raid on the Moscow theatre. In the short term, it is not so much that the Western media need to know, but that Russian doctors treating the former hostages were reportedly not told either.

The secrecy serves no purpose. Now that it has emerged that the gas was, in fact, responsible for most of the fatalities, the authorities will come under intense pressure to reveal what it was and why it was chosen. The truth is almost bound to reflect better on the decision-makers than the wild speculation which would fill the vacuum.

Mr Putin ought to realise that openness and co-operation will strengthen his hand, instead of retreating to the Cold War notion that it shows weakness. National leaders around the world will sympathise with his no-win dilemma over the siege; they will recognise that it may be their sombre responsibility one day to deal with a similar situation.

Everyone would have wished that the death toll in Moscow could have been much lower than it was – but it is only by learning from the Russians' experience that we can improve the odds the next time a group of desperadoes somewhere in the world takes civilians prisoner.