United Nations: What's gone wrong? / The limits of the possible: The promise of a golden era for the UN has turned to dust. Michael Sheridan reports

AT THE end of the Cold War the United Nations passed briefly through a state of euphoria during which anything seemed possible. Dictators would be deterred, democracy promoted, ancient wrongs put right. The organisation has fallen back to earth with an unpleasant jolt. From Sarajevo to Mogadishu, the Old World - fierce, tribal and pitiless - once again teaches idealists the limits of the possible.

Founded in 1945 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war', the UN finds itself embroiled in Somalia and Bosnia. Its charter called on the assembled nations 'to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights' but the plight of people in many member states remains so deplorable that a High Commissioner for Human Rights is now to be appointed.

The UN's programmes have done much to remedy hunger, cure disease, alleviate poverty and promote development. But the zeal of those who set up the big UN agencies has decayed into cynicism, consumed by a sense of helplessness at waste, patronage and incompetence.

So what must be done? The first step is to recognise that the UN remains the creation of the settlement of 1945. The Security Council reproduces the balance of interests at Yalta and Potsdam. Yet in the last decade of this century, Germany and Japan are roughly where they were at its beginning - economically dynamic powers claiming seats at the world's top table.

The first time round, political folly led to the diversion of their industrial genius into ruinous wars of conquest. The price was paid long ago, the errors of diplomacy need not be replayed. Germany and Japan should therefore be admitted as permanent members to the Security Council as soon as is practical.

This decision demands as much enlightened sacrifice from Britain and France as responsibility from Bonn and Tokyo. But it is crucial to the process of reform within the UN. A broader Security Council and a streamlined secretariat should provide the vital components of a newly credible international authority.

Peace-keeping is the first priority. A standing UN army would not work. But countries with well-trained armed forces could earmark and train troops for regular duty with the UN. The military staff committee for the Security Council provides the simplest focus for co-ordination under the UN charter. Governments and general staffs should put aside their reservations and reinvigorate the committee as an operations centre. Preventive diplomacy - the avoidance of war by unarmed, but powerfully backed, political intervention - is the second pillar of this policy. The Anglo-French suggestion of a force of trained diplomats deployed to defuse conflict should be put into practice.

As long as the Cold War order held sway, the UN's deficiencies prompted only a helpless shrug. Indeed, the faults of the 'UN system' in part derive from the Anglo-American ethos that created its institutions. The founders set up a civil service culture that assumed duty and obligation, meritocracy and fair play. It was ill- equipped to deal with the timeserver, the bully or the cousin of the president. The tentative steps undertaken towards reform will do no good unless they are strengthened and carried into the vast feudal domains of the UN's specialised agencies, the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the World Health Organisation, the International Labour Organisation, and so on.

An effective UN can no longer tolerate the extended rule of individuals such as Edouard Saouma at FAO and Hiroshi Nakajima at WHO. In future no head of any UN agency should serve more than one five-year term in office.

At the same time, Western donor nations must link continued financial support to close monitoring of performance. This is not arrogance, it is responsibility. The adage that aid means 'taxes paid by poor people in rich countries to support rich people in poor countries' was often, sadly, founded upon truth.

In future, governments must be more forceful in dealing with the agencies. British and US withdrawal from Unesco set a salutary example. If the UN system fails to deliver satisfactory aid, then the donor government should contract out the work to a private charity or other institutions.

Doing business by international consent is always more complicated, more time-consuming and more inefficient than simple action by a sovereign state. But as the UN nears its 50th anniversary in 1995, there is no choice but to rise to the challenge. Britain, as a founder member, should be in the vanguard of the movement for change.