We have come to the end of the strange marathon of a voting procedure in Russia, when for an entire week citizens could vote a single “yes” or “no” on 206 amendments to the constitution. The results – not surprising to anyone, and definitely pleasing to the Kremlin – show 78 per cent support for “resetting” the count on Vladimir Putin’s terms as a president, allowing him to potentially serve until 2036, and increasing his influence over all branches of government.

With a 65 per cent turnout, the Kremlin’s target has been exceeded. The vote was called to add a veneer of legitimacy to changes which have already been made to the constitution, but in this regard, it is not clear that the exercise has been a success.

This vote was not just a typical Russian elections, involving a number of fraud allegations. The technical and practical procedures involved made a mockery of the process. To start with, this was not a referendum, for which there is an established constitutional process; instead, it was a ‘national vote’ – a concept invented for this purpose. The electorate was fully informed about the weight of this procedure when ahead of the vote Ella Pamfilova, Chairwoman of the Russian Central Election Commission, explained that Putin’s desire to hear the public’s opinion was laudable, but not necessary – as the amendments have already been “accepted”.

The Covid-19 crisis provided the Kremlin with an excuse to ‘socially-distance’ voting from independent oversight: polling stations sprang up on park benches and out of car boots, election volunteers visited people in their homes and at work places, and a large share of voting happened online. Such clearly flawed voting procedures (which Valentina Matviyenko, Chairwoman of the Federation Council, has already proposed be made standard for future elections) will make it hard for the general public to take the very idea of voting seriously.

Unintentionally, the Kremlin has created a stark trade-off. The greater the lengths it has gone to in seeking high turnout and approval figures, the less able it has been to create a picture of a valid or legitimate process. The Kremlin spent significant amounts of political capital to get its base out to vote at any cost in the midst of a pandemic.

If the effect is increased voter fatigue and apathy, it could seriously impede the Kremlin’s ability to secure support in the series of more practically-important votes to come: the gubernatorial elections in September and the Duma elections in 2021.

In the face of a looming second wave and economic damage from COVID-19, the support for government-backed candidates could take a hit and offer the opposition the chance to make gains. With signs of civic mobilisation against Putin’s move seen in big cities and some regions, the Kremlin might have created future headaches for itself.

The vote on the constitutional amendments is only the first, and a purely symbolic, stage of the Kremlin’s reform plan. The next stage is establishing how the government will function after the reshaping of the balance of power.

However, this new order will be built on weak foundations. Russia is left without a strong constitution or robust political institutions, which have all have either been weakened by recent amendments or discredited by the months of controversy over pushing them through.

Respect among the public for the rule of law is already chronically low in Russia and the new constitution will do nothing to change that, born as it is from such a public show of its illegitimacy. Putin may have managed to push through his constitutional changes, but the ongoing damage being done to rule of law in Russia means this does little to cement his position.

Professor Nikolai Petrov is senior research fellow on the Russia and Eurasia programme at Chatham House. Ekaterina Aleynikova is a research assistant on the same programme.