Few Secretaries of State have been as active as John Kerry. But is the US sufficiently behind him?

When Washington has taken decisive action, as in Iraq or Afghanistan, it is widely assailed as a blundering, arrogant warmonger

The US Secretary of State John Kerry embodies the paradox of current US foreign policy – in particular in the Middle East, the region that continues to consume the main energies of American diplomacy. Rarely has that diplomacy been as active and, in some respects as bold, as today. Rarely though have accusations been louder that America is enfeebled and in retreat.

Mr Kerry is engaged on three immensely challenging and overlapping fronts: the efforts to end the civil war in Syria; the West’s search for a nuclear deal with Iran that might end three decades of hostility between Washington and Tehran; and the renewed drive to secure a two-state settlement between Israel and Palestinians that has eluded negotiators since 1948.

The report card, as of now, is mixed. The greatest progress has been made with Iran, with the interim deal that freezes parts of that country’s nuclear programme for six months. Everything could yet unravel, but Americans and Iranians are talking to each other.

Syria on the other hand constitutes a total failure, one epitomised by the recent Geneva conference which could not even produce agreement on bringing humanitarian aid to civilians trapped by the conflict. Russia continues to arm the regime, while progress on sealing President Bashar al-Assad’s pledge to give up his chemical weapons has come to a virtual standstill.

Less clear is the current state of play in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Mr Kerry has been indefatigable in keeping talks going. For his admirers, this involvement and persistence is proof of resolve, and his courage in placing his prestige on the line in a way that his predecessor Hillary Clinton, for all her celebrity and presumed clout, never did. For detractors (not a few of them in the Israeli government), the Secretary is merely on an ego trip, driven by a naïve belief in the triumph of hope over experience. The impartial for their part wonder whether Mr Kerry’s goal of a “framework” plan, whereby the two sides agree on the shape of final settlement and then work out the details, is really any different from the “road maps” and other diplomatic formulae that have littered 65 years of futile peacemaking.

On all three fronts, meanwhile, Mr Kerry’s efforts have highlighted the “Damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don’t” dilemma faced by the US in the Middle East. America is expected to “lead”, even if its ability to shape the region and bend history to its will is often grossly exaggerated. When Washington has taken decisive action, as in Iraq or Afghanistan, it is widely assailed as a blundering, arrogant warmonger. After those two long and costly conflicts, the US has no appetite for another. Yet, when it declines to intervene robustly, as now over Syria and to a lesser extent over Egypt, it is accused of abandoning its responsibilities, and of condoning tyranny and human rights abuses – as if it could wave a magic wand and all would be well.

The most effective Secretaries of State tend to be those closest to their respective Presidents. Henry Kissinger under Richard Nixon and James Baker during the George HW Bush spring to mind. Barely a year into Mr Kerry’s tenure, it is too early to say whether he will join this company. But success on even one of the three challenges would be a notable achievement.