Leading article: Burma's isolation must be made more complete

Western powers should put pressure on the junta's Asian trading partners

Aung San Suu Kyi's farce of a trial has finally ended. Burma's democratically elected leader has been found guilty of violating the conditions of her house arrest. The ruling junta cut the three-year sentence initially handed down by the Rangoon court in half. It also downgraded the punishment from hard labour to an extension of house arrest.

Some analysts have seen this as a sign that the junta was swayed by international lobbying on Ms Suu Kyi's behalf. Likewise, they have interpreted the fact that journalists were allowed into the courtroom for the sentencing as an indication that the regime is opening itself up a little to the outside world. Sadly, such optimism is almost certainly misplaced.

The primary purpose of this kangaroo court was to get Ms Suu Kyi out of the way for elections the junta is planning to hold next year. The generals who run the country are perfectly capable of devising another pretext for extending Ms Suu Kyi's detention after 18 months have passed. Indeed, intermittent persecution has been the pattern of the junta's treatment of Ms Suu Kyi ever since her party won an overwhelming victory in free elections two decades ago. The regime seems to be strengthening its hand in other areas. The new constitution and next year's poll threatens to cement the dominance of military rule. Last week, reports emerged of the Burmese regime collaborating with North Korea to build the junta a nuclear arsenal. The regime has moved its capital deep into the jungle interior. This is not the behaviour of a regime that desires to open itself up to the outside world.

In outrage at the sentence handed down to Ms Suu Kyi, the French government yesterday proposed a fresh round of European Union sanctions. Our own Government pledged to push for a United Nations arms embargo. These efforts should not be scorned, not least because Ms Suu Kyi and her supporters are adamant that democratic governments should keep up their pressure on the regime. And the existing sanctions are not watertight. More can be done to prevent Burmese timber, for instance, reaching European markets.

Yet it is increasingly clear that the junta can live with the opprobrium and punishment of western democracies so long as it can count on the support of China, India and other governments in the region hungry for access to Burma's abundant natural resources. The regime can survive on the proceeds from selling its natural gas, timber and gems.

Western pressure ought to be applied on those Asian states that privately succour the junta. It is not France which sells the junta arms, but China. It is not in London that the generals have second homes, but in Thailand. And it will be the 10-country Association of South-East Asian Nations (Asean), not the European Union, that ultimately pulls the plug on the regime.

The allegations of North Korean-Burmese nuclear co-operation might just provide the necessary leverage for the West to persuade Asian powers to end their indulgence of the junta. North Korea's increasingly erratic behaviour has upset its Chinese ally. If Burma seems likely to go down the same path, it might just persuade Beijing to act.

Isolation of the junta has manifestly failed to temper its vicious oppression of the Burmese people. But it does not follow that the policy should be reversed. Rather, democratic governments should be using every means at their disposal to make that isolation more complete.