The Inspector: Inspectors will need to test access pledges

The dossier released yesterday constitutes a classic threat assessment on the Iraq issue: threat = capability + intent. Indeed, by going into both the capability and the intent of the Iraqi regime in the field of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the report appears to draw the British government position closer to that of the United States.

To date the government position has focused on Iraq's WMD and the importance of getting United Nations inspectors back into the country, whereas the recent American position under George Bush has focused on regime change.

The structure and content of the dossier is likely to contribute to the legitimacy which the Government appears to be seeking for supporting the United States in any future military action against Iraq.

For example, in part three, "Iraq under Saddam Hussein", the regime's record of internal repression and aggression beyond its borders is laid out in some detail. The document follows a logical and predictable approach by assessing Iraq's historical development of WMD from 1971-98, then addressing the past four years during which the Iraqi regime has been free from UN weapons inspectors. The Government was under intense pressure to provide new and convincing evidence that Saddam Hussein has been pressing ahead with his WMD aspirations during that period. In that respect, the dossier certainly presented new material on Iraq's endeavours.

In the nuclear field, attention was drawn to Iraq's pursuit of significant quantities of uranium from Africa, although specific details are not given.

Iraq's lack of an active civil nuclear power programme, as noted in the dossier, does warrant concern and raises the potential that this material was destined for enrichment in Iraq. Other information provided by the dossier on specific procurement activities in the nuclear field also points to Iraq's likely efforts in the field of gas centrifuge enrichment of uranium to produce weapons-usable fissile material.

In the field of chemical and biological weapons, the dossier drew attention to the existence of new facilities and the disturbing revelation that some of these weapons "are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them".

Although the mode of delivery is not given, it appears likely this assessment was based on either aerial delivered gravity bombs or artillery shells, or potentially "special warheads" for Iraq's inventory of proscribed 400-mile-range al-Hussein ballistic missiles.

The most significant revelations came with regard to Iraq's development of long-range missiles.

If the UN inspectors go back into Iraq, with or without a new Security Council resolution, it will be important to test the commitment of the Iraqis to unconditional access as soon as possible. One way to do this would be for a national government to provide the inspectors with timely, near real-time, intelligence on the location of proscribed materials. If the inspectors can identify and travel to suspect locations before the Iraqi regime can activate its concealment mechanism, this would put the ball very much in Saddam's court by testing his commitment to unconditional access – and therefore to giving up his WMD capabilities – sooner rather than later.

The author was a ballistic missile inspector with the UN Special Commission in Iraq in 1997 and 1998. He is a senior lecturer in defence studies at King's College London.