Why drive to Baghdad was a textbook campaign, flaws and all

Iraq 2003 is a campaign "military historians and academics will pore over for many years to come", according to Air Marshal Sir Brian Burridge, the top British commander in the Gulf.

The rapid success of the military invasion can be traced to the combination of American technological superiority, speed and firepower and the disorganised defence mounted by the Iraqis.

Plan 1003 Victor, the Pentagon war plan, had two key principles: "inside out" and "Baghdad first". It may not have been be quite as radical as some are claiming, but it was extraordinarily successful.

From the word go Baghdad, the Iraqi centre of gravity, was clearly the main target. Everything else took second place. That is an old principle of war, and one stressed by the Russians. Rigorous denuding of subsidiary sectors and concentration of force on the principal and overriding objective.

Never was that clearer than in 3rd Infantry Division's audacious, almost rash, drive for Baghdad. The principle was also stressed by General William T Sherman in his drive through Georgia in the American Civil War, which split the Confederacy in two.

"Our aim was to be aggressive and dominate and keep driving for the capital," Colonel Bryan P McCoy of the US Marines said. "We had to be innovative. On one occasion we did a 60-kilometre armoured reconnaissance through threevillages. That way we made sure the enemy was always on the back foot and we had the whip hand.

"When it came to Baghdad," Col McCoy continued, "we started doing it sector by sector. But then we improvised, and we moved into the east bank. The idea is to use our speed and our firepower, and ally it with our intelligence. We use that to find out where the bad guys are and then we get them."

The overwhelming US technological superiority was vital to the rapid success. Not so much in terms of smart bombs, but in terms of intelligence and targeting. New intelligence means, including unmanned air vehicles – drones – fed intelligence back around the clock, through smoke and sandstorms. It was imperfect. But it was still impressive.

In the words of one US analyst, Dr Stephen Cambone, the co-ordination of intelligence and operations is "beginning to emerge as a new mission area in its own right".

The crucial innovation in war in the past decade has been intelligence and targeting. Not only being able to see what the enemy is doing, but analysis beforehand to determine exactly which sinews to sever to stop the muscles working. It is still messy, and there are still mistakes. Keyhole surgery notwithstanding, you can't be a surgeon if you are squeamish.

Special forces have played a pivotal role. "Special forces have never been used this extensively," Ike Skelton, the senior Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, said. Their role has been crucial not only in freeing prisoners of war and attacking Iraqi leaders, but also in the north where they have been the link with Kurdish peshmerga fighters.

A disadvantage of precision-guided weapons is that to be really effective they require absolutely precise information. Over the past three weeks US forces have operated to obtain and pass on that data.

The Special Operations Forces – the nearest America has to the SAS and SBS – spotted targets and quickly transmitted the information to warplanes circling near by. Reconnaissance drones loitered over the battlefield, showing US commanders Iraqi movements in real time. Back in Qatar, General Franks had real-time pictures of numerous targets simultaneously visible on large screens.

British and US casualties would unquestionably have been far greater and progress slower if the majority of the Iraqis had fought better. We still do not know how much the Allied air campaign over the past dozen years in northern and southern Iraq and the strikes on Baghdad contributed to Iraqi disorganisation and collapse.

The assault on Baghdad confirmed the value of the very flexible plan. After largely defeating the four Republican Guard divisions ringing Baghdad, the plan was to encircle the city and launch armed and armoured raids or feints inside. US sources said they expected this phase to last about a week. But after only three days, US troops were in the centre of the city occupying vital government buildings, presidential palaces and prisons.

Buoyed by relatively weak Iraqi resistance, the 3rd Infantry Division launched three big task forces – brigade strength – to infiltrate the city, like water trickling into the cracks in a dam. "The tactics are armoured raids and then exploit success, exploit opportunity," Air Marshal Burridge said. "And it's very much a tactical battle."

The air marshal, who was formerly head of the UK Command and General Staff College, made a vital point. The US plan 1003 Victor was very good at the tactical level – battalions and brigades securing a foothold and then spilling outwards, narrowing the space where top officials might be hiding. It was very good operationally and at the military-strategic level, driving for the centre of gravity – Baghdad – and eschewing other distractions.

But at the politico-strategic level it may yet prove flawed. If the aim was to bring peace and liberation to Iraq, the political end-state needed to be enunciated more clearly. There should, above all, have been a plan to fill the "security gap" that has now opened up. The American forces are not well equipped or trained to handle sporadic local resistance, widespread anarchy and the collapse of law and order.

The British in Basra have proved much better prepared to handle this problem, partly for historical and cultural reasons. Conversely, they could not have moved three brigades and sustained them at the distance the Americans have.

Military historians and academics will, indeed, pore over 1003 Victor for many years to come. They will probably give it 90 per cent for military and operational content, but mark it down for its conclusion. "The hard part is to come," as a retired US colonel, Johnny Brooks, said. "We can easily win the fight but lose the peace."

Christopher Bellamy is professor of military science and doctrine at Cranfield University