Focus: Part two Strategy, tactics and weapons - How will the war be fought?

If there is an invasion where will America and its allies strike first? Does Saddam have any chance at all of stopping them? Eleanor Goldsworthy explains how the attack might unfold and how Baghdad might fall

The mission of the coalition troops for the war against Iraq will be simple enough: to kill or capture Saddam Hussein and render his forces incapable of further decisive military action. But the tasks resulting from this mission will not be simple. Coalition troops will have to secure ports and land borders, oil and other industrial installations and lines of communication, as well as making safe all major towns and cities.

Contingency plans will include the protection of coalition troops from chemical or biological attack; the protection of Iraqi citizens, including the Kurds in the north, from any attack by their current rulers; and the protection of Iraq's neighbours from missile attack.

Yesterday George Bush and Tony Blair agreed their strategy was to disarm Saddam by force if he would not give up weapons of mass destruction voluntarily. The Iraqi leader's mission is likely to be to preserve his own life and that of his immediate family and to maintain his hold on power. As he cannot hope to win a direct war against the US, he will attack his enemy's will to fight, most effectively by killing as many coalition troops as possible, thereby creating a political nightmare for the leaders of Britain and America.

Saddam will also seek to undermine what little domestic and international support the coalition leaders have with a campaign routed through the world's media camped out in Baghdad. He may also encourage terrorist attacks on the UK and US.

Given Saddam's aims, coalition military planners are unlikely to take risks. Why then have they considered so publicly an amphibious assault aimed at securing Basra? This would now lack any element of surprise and meet considerable opposition. Even an ill-equipped and inept enemy could carry out basic defensive measures enough to cause a high number of casualties. The truth is that deploying troops who are capable of an amphibious assault – such as those currently sailing to the Gulf with 3 Commando – does not mean there will be one. They are capable of being useful in other ways beside an attack on the land from the sea. But presenting this as a credible threatgives Saddam Hussein one more possibility to worry about and plan for.

The US and UK have put together a sizeable and wide-ranging force. This means three things: war plans can be flexible, different types of operations can occur concurrently and Saddam will not know exactly what is coming. His troops will be carrying out needless tasks in locations that suit the coalition.

Taking into account climatic, political and logistical factors, it seems unlikely that an air campaign would begin before mid-February or a ground campaign start after late March. Those attacking from the air will aim to break the cohesion of the Iraqi forces and the integrity of their command and control systems. US media reports have suggested 400 cruise missiles might be launched on the first day. Infrastructure and lines of communication will be hit more sparingly than during the last Gulf War, however: first because coalition forces will need to use some of what is left during the ground war themselves and second because they will wish to support a rapid transition to a new post-Saddam government. The campaign to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people has already begun.

There will also be extreme vigilance about avoiding civilian casualties. After all, this is a war aimed at supposedly liberating the Iraqi people from Saddam, not about destroying the country and people of Iraq.

An air campaign lasting no longer than a week might be followed by, or overlap with, a huge armoured invasion from Kuwait. Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, said yesterday that he could think of "a dozen" countries that would assist military action. If the discussions between the US and Turkey are fruitful, it is possible there may be a concurrent invasion of northern Iraq. Anticipating this, Saddam will probably position a large force in the north by Mosul, meaning this area is hit hard during the air campaign. Troops attacking from the north would be tasked with securing Mosul, Kirkuk and neighbouring oil installations.

The main effort during this first phase of the ground war is likely to be the responsibility of the southern forces, with most heading directly north for Baghdad, some heading northwest to provide flank protection and other units for Basra to cut it off. Iraqi troops holed up in Basra, unable to contact their military leaders, are unlikely to hold out and could surrender without the fear of immediate reprisals faced by those closer to the presidential strongholds. If Saddam anticipates this and removes his forces from Basra an amphibious landing near there might be possible, although the terrain would be booby-trapped. Tikrit, the next big prize for coalition troops to go after, is unlikely to be captured without a sizeable force.

In this scenario, phase one of the ground war could end with borders reasonably secured, exits cut off, and Baghdad surrounded. In an ideal scenario for the US and UK, Saddam would deploy his armour to meet the invading forces as they approached the capital. His tanks would be destroyed, his men surrender and the coalition tanks roll into an undefended Baghdad with minimal loss of life.

It is unlikely to be so easy. To keep the momentum going, the coalition might employ a dual strategy of tightening the noose around Baghdad while consolidating gains across the rest of the country.

At this crucial point the people of Iraq might be tempted to take the future into their own hands. It might not take much of a push from within a besieged Baghdad to swing the pendulum against Saddam. The collapse of his regime might well be swift. But what then? The military campaign may take no longer than three weeks. The headache that follows for the people of Iraq will last a lot longer than that.

Eleanor Goldsworthy is head of the UK armed forces programme at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies

And are the British up to it?

Last time 'our boys' went to the desert the rifles jammed and tanks got sand in their engines. Peter Caddick Adams reports on the state of the armed forces as they prepare to do battle

Despite recent criticism of some British military equipment, troops preparing for offensive operations in Iraq insist they are ready for war. Morale among the 26,000 soldiers of 1st Armoured Division appears to be high and they are well trained for an invasion. Their preparations will have involved live-firing exercises on special ranges in Canada, where infantry, artillery, tanks and aircraft learn to work together in a high-intensity modern battlefield scenario.

High-intensity fighting requires troops to be able to advance at high speed through hostile terrain. Infantry are taught to live from their Warrior armoured vehicles, mount quick attacks, defend themselves from air attack and to operate at night. Self-sufficient mobile armoured columns rove over the battlefield, retaining momentum and keeping their enemy off balance as they hit hard and fast. It is a gruelling mental and physical experience for anyone forced to operate this way for days on end.

Other kinds of troops deploying, such as the paratroops of 16 Air Assault Brigade or the Royal Marines of 3 Commando Brigade, who are already at sea, are mostly hardened veterans of recent fighting in Sierra Leone or Afghanistan. All these combat troops regularly carry out rigorous exercises against chemical attack as part of their routine annual training requirements, which will have added realism with an Iraqi war looming. The aircraft and ships that will support any invasion have already been involved in operations in the Gulf area.

Shortcomings in equipment that have surfaced in recent training – unreliable rifles, obsolete radio sets and tanks that broke down – have also been corrected, insist Ministry of Defence officials. A training exercise in Oman in 2001 highlighted many embarrassing problems concerning British kit and analysts believe that the troops deploying now will benefit from the lessons learned then.

Chief among past problems was the tendency of the SA80 rifle to jam in conditions of extreme heat. An improved version, the SA80-A2 (above right) was released to troops last summer, after 15,000 rounds were test-fired in the Kuwaiti desert. Soldiers traditionally moan about any new weapons they are given, but service personnel all admit that the SA80 is light and accurate. Although the rifle continues to receive mixed reviews from the troops, it easily outclasses any personal weapons Iraqi soldiers may have.

The need for better control on the battlefield has meant that bulky and obsolete Clansman radio sets have been replaced by the Bowman Personal Role Radio, each as small as a mobile phone and issued to every combat infantry man. In 2001, thanks to efforts to save money, none of the Challenger 2 tanks (below) used in Oman had been converted for desert use – so their air filters clogged up. The MoD has since ordered desert conversion kits for the fleet of 120 Challenger 2s now heading to the Gulf. They join 150 Warriors and 32 AS-90 self-propelled guns.

While the troops and their tanks may be training for the right kind of war, what happens if the ground war lasts much longer than the short, sharp shock many analysts are expecting? Iraq is still capable of unleashing a nasty surprise or two on the coalition. Saddam Hussein may choose to defend Baghdad block by block.

Yet in manpower terms, this needs to be a quick war for the British army. The UK only has six armour-trained regiments and three of these now have an appointment in the Gulf, so it will be less easy to sustain and replace the 36,000-strong task force out of a field army that numbers just over 100,000, plus 40,000 Territorials. Many other troops are still deployed elsewhere overseas and on fire-fighting duties – and families are not impressed if their loved ones return from one operation then deploy on another straight away.

When it comes to the post-combat phase, defence analysts point out that the skills and equipment needed for the high-intensity fighting that will accompany any invasion of Iraq are radically different to those needed for a low-intensity peacekeeping-style operation that will accompany any occupation of Iraq. Heavy metal and hard minds will need to be replaced by civilian-friendly Land Rovers and smiling faces. British forces have gained an international reputation for being good at both, but can only perform one role at a time.

As they fight the Iraqi army, coalition troops will encounter displaced civilians for whom, initially, they will be able to do nothing. Orders will prohibit them from stopping to offer aid. Military logistics will be geared to supporting combat troops, not issuing blankets to civilians, and they cannot do both.

The effect of so many NHS personnel away in Iraq with the military medical services will act as an incentive to conclude the campaign as speedily as possible, never mind the growing heat of the Iraqi desert if operations slip into mid-summer. On the Oman exercise in 2001, more than 300 soldiers became ill, suffering severe stomach pains and vomiting, because of heat-related hygiene problems.

Once the fighting ends, troops will work in conjunction with international aid agencies to alleviate the human misery that accompanies modern conflict. Iraq will test Britain's military professionalism, but a long desert campaign for the overstretched British army may be the proverbial straw for the camel's back.

Peter Caddick Adams lectures at the National Defence Academy