Andreas Whittam Smith: The flaw at the top that's causing businesses to fail
Fingers are pointed at the FSA. But I believe we should turn our attention elsewhere
Monday, 14 July 2008
Whom should we have blamed for the collapse of Northern Rock? Or whom should we criticise for the near collapse of Bradford & Bingley the other day, leaving it to be rescued by its largest shareholders? Fingers are pointed at the regulators, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the Bank of England. And this is fair enough so far as it goes. The FSA had ample warnings that Northern Rock's way of doing business, for instance, was coming apart at the seams.
Yet first of all, I believe, we should turn our attention to the board of directors. I have been using Alex Brummer's account of what he calls "the scandal of Northern Rock" published last week by Random House and entitled The Crunch as a means of seeing more deeply into the workings of the bank's senior management. For what happened at Northern Rock can stand for many other companies that have gone under in spite of the presence on the board of respectable, even distinguished directors.
The Northern Rock executives were led by Adam Applegarth. He joined the company straight from Durham University as a graduate trainee. He climbed up through the ranks and became chief executive at 38. He had no banking qualifications. Instead he was, writes Mr Brummer in his book, "a driven marketing man who dreamed of overtaking the high street banks".
As a matter of fact, I don't see the absence of banking qualifications as a problem, provided other senior managers had the necessary banking skills. An intelligent person cannot be ignorant of banking if he or she has spent 15 years working for something called a bank before becoming its chief executive. Moreover, marketing has its own valuable expertise, a deep knowledge of the needs and desires of the bank's customers.
It is when Mr Brummer begins to add more flesh to the bones that we begin to see the problem. "He [Applegarth] was an old-fashioned, hard-line martinet of a manager who was difficult to challenge ... He surrounded himself with yes men who worked their way up the company and were dependent on him."
This is a familiar type. I believe that their imperviousness to criticism is a serious flaw. When the storm broke, Mr Applegarth's deputy went home ill within a few days. And the executive who had been responsible for the bank's unwise borrowings declared himself unfit. Mr Applegarth was left on his own, dangerously isolated. Which raises the question: "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" Who watches the watchmen?
The answer has to be the chairman and non-executive directors. They have been blamed for allowing the bank to overtrade. That is too broad. Their main fault was not controlling Mr Applegarth, described as "powerful enough to ride roughshod over the bank's board of directors, which lacked the confidence or ability to call a halt to the imprudent expansion".
Mr Applegarth may have lacked banking skills, but his chairman, the Hon Matt Ridley, albeit distinguished, had no business experience at all. He is a brilliant science writer and former Economist journalist. He is also the scion of a old north-eastern aristocratic family. His appointment preserved a link with Northern Rock's past when it was a building society desirous of demonstrating that it had the backing of the local gentry.
By the early 21st century, however, Mr Ridley was an eccentric choice for a board of directors to make. There is one more curiosity to note. Mr Ridley was paid £315,000 a year, well above the going rate. You often find high pay in companies that are going wrong; it is designed to keep everybody's mouths shut.
If all else failed there was always Sir Derek Wanless, the non-executive director who headed Northern Rock's audit and risk committees, a position equivalent to sitting next to the driver, seeing the road ahead and able to note every gear change, every depression of the brake pedal and the speed round corners.
Who wouldn't have chosen Sir Derek for this task, the local grammar school boy who went up to King's College Cambridge and obtained a first in mathematics. He became a professional banker and rose to be the chief executive of NatWest before it was taken over. He was everything Mr Applegarth wasn't. If anybody could speak with authority to the chief executive, direct the chairman's attention to faults in the business model and honk the horn, it was Sir Derek.
I have no idea whether Sir Derek did any of these things. I do know that Northern Rock drove straight into a wall without a touch on the brakes. The non-executive directors seem to have been too polite to say anything to the driver. I hold them chiefly responsible for the collapse of Northern Rock.





When did you last see very senior managers and CEOs asking for and looking at small, but important details - avoiding the devil. Always it is extreme summaries and the 'big picture'. I used to tell my team that if you want to focus on vision and the big picture, go and watch Ben Hur. The failure at T5 was for that very reason. Forget MBA-centric mantras and the over-concentration on often the wrong metrics..understand the underlying fundamentals and the history of the industry over the long run. Remember how the focus is on the last three years, but the customer and the purpose of the business gets subsumed? Remember the extreme confidence of the senior guys, when what they believe as unquestionably true is really unknowable? Remember how some really big deals seem to go ahead on a nod, but good strategic (but less sexy) business gets passed over? Remember how CEO-backed systems developments are approved giving 80-90% functionality, when the other 10-20% is the most important?
Posted by Padraig O'Ryan | 14.07.08, 16:02 GMT
I understand that Sir Derek Wanless is also Chairman of Northumbria Water Group. Additionally, he took time out to write the NHS Funding reports for Gordon Brown. Regards the latter, of course Blair had already pledged the funding, and Brown was merely looking for a stooge to justify a tax hike. My point is, how much spare time could Wanless afford, to provide the prudent governance, direction, and actuarial advice, for which he was paid a handsome salary at Northern Rock ?
Clearly, the answer was 'not a lot' !!!!
Posted by Jeff | 14.07.08, 13:15 GMT
Yes, of course Wanless was culpable. He was paid by NR to look out for icebergs, whilst Applegarth steamed ahead at full speed. Wanless was found asleep on his watch. The consequence of Wanless not doing his job was a monolithic crisis affecting the pockets of every taxpayer in the UK. You forget, Wanless did not retire with grace from NatWest in the 90's. He was ousted, for what The Commons Treasury Select Committee described as failings not dissimilar to those uncovered at NR. What a disgrace to now discover that Wanless remains on the Board for Actuarial Standards. This, despite his charge for culpability in the biggest actuarial faux pas since Queen Victoria held the throne ! Have the lunatics finally taken over the asylum ?
Posted by John | 14.07.08, 12:23 GMT
Elsewhere today you report that two directors of failing Dawnay Day hold between themselves 250 directorships. How much time can they give to any thoughtful governance of each?
There is systemic corruption embedded within corporate Britain, where many directors view the businesses they preside over as cash cows, taking staggering salaries by milking shareholders and customers alike, whilst doing little or no real work. They get away with this through the active connivance of fund managers, who believe that the "rate for the job" applies to themselves as well.
Perhaps Baldrick can find a cunning Plan to treat this rot.
Posted by Tony Peterson | 14.07.08, 07:35 GMT
What about the Bank of England? When the crisis hit, the Bank decided that EU rules prevented it from acting. Even if that's true, ( and the EU deny it) why did the Bank allow rules to go through which blocked it from intervening. It also said the Lloyds bid was impossible because it would break Takeover Panel rules. Again, why did the Bank not forsee circumstances might arise in which a quick solution to a bank crisis would be needed.
The Treasury no doubt deserves it's share of the blame, but in the rush to attack it too many people have whitewashed fundamental errors of competence by the Bank of England.
Posted by Daphne Millar | 14.07.08, 06:53 GMT
Ive seen some shenanigans in my 40 year long working life. Management? Dont make me laugh.
Quote, Bernard Montgomery: They remained in office playing musical chairs, but without ever taking a chair away.
Quote, Lee Iacocca: In conversation you can get away with all kinds of vagueness and nonsense..............never mind the answers, these guys didnt even know the questions!.........When you have a guy who isnt very sure of himself on the job, the very last thing he wants is a guy backing him up who IS sure of himself. He figures. If the next guy is too good, hell show me up, and eventually hell replace me. As a result, one incompetent manager brings in another. And all of them hide behind the weakness of the system.
This just about puts management in a nutshell, and explains why I dont hand over my modest savings for someone else to invest on my behalf, stupidly thinking I can put my feet up and let the dividends roll in automatically.
Posted by Alan Robinson | 14.07.08, 05:42 GMT