Now the Palestinians need help from President Bush

He could outline, and in writing, the concessions he expects in any final settlement

Seeking to rebut the belief among several Palestinian officials that Tony Blair was obliged to persuade Mahmoud Abbas to even attend today's London conference, their British counterparts insist that, no, he has always wanted to come but couldn't do so unless he was sure that things were reasonably calm at home.

Seeking to rebut the belief among several Palestinian officials that Tony Blair was obliged to persuade Mahmoud Abbas to even attend today's London conference, their British counterparts insist that, no, he has always wanted to come but couldn't do so unless he was sure that things were reasonably calm at home.

If that's true, Mr Abbas must have had another moment of acute hesitation in the early hours of Saturday morning after he was told about the suicide bomb which killed five Israelis in Tel Aviv. For the attack has markedly underlined the pressures of what must be one of the world's most daunting political jobs.

It is hardly surprising that public calls for him to do by military means what he has been trying to do by negotiations, namely eradicate violence by the armed factions, have increased since last Friday. With a security apparatus still far from up to the task after four years of conflict, he must have known after the bombing that his honeymoon, if he ever had one, was over.

That said, he could hardly avoid coming, especially given the presence of a new US Secretary of State; it may even be - within limits - worth his while. Within the severe constraints imposed by Israel's determination to ensure this did not turn into an international peace summit, the Palestinians have at least secured language, in the document that will emerge this afternoon, which recognises that Israel, too, has obligations under the road map.

And some of the practical help envisaged in its 17 pages, he could certainly do with: especially the new US-led security group which at least gives Washington a tangible stake in Mr Abbas's success.

But the international help Mr Abbas needs extends well beyond the practical measures, however welcome, he can count on today. For there is still a series of competing visions of where the process is going in the short term. Mr Abbas emphasised, in his interview with The Independent yesterday, the importance of an Israeli military pull-back to its positions before the intifada started well over four years ago because he believes, not unreasonably, this would help him to stop attacks; Israel sees the halt to violence coming first, the pull back second.

But the differences go way beyond that, to the nature of the political horizon itself. Mr Abbas again made clear yesterday to The Independent that he wants to move, within his and Mr Sharon's political lifetime, to "permanent status" talks on a final settlement of the conflict. Some of the more reasonable people around Mr Sharon are much less contemptuous of the road map, per se, than they were in Yasser Arafat's time. Instead, they argue that the two leaders' internal political problems make it impossible to reach the compromises needed for permanent status, even if they were inclined to do so. So why not make the only foreseeable goal Phase II of the road map and the "provisional" state envisaged in it with - as yet ominously unspecified - temporary borders?

The British and, interestingly, some well-informed Israelis believe that Mr Bush disagrees - and instead want the historic prize of a permanent status settlement in his political lifetime. It is possible that Washington does now get a fairly obvious fact - namely that Mr Abbas's problems in keeping the peace would become well-nigh impossible if the best he could hope for was an interim "state", quite possibly with the hated separation barrier as its border. (That still leaves a different US problem: Mr Bush's curious preoccupation with "democratising" the Palestinian polity - even though it is for all its manifest imperfections, the most democratic in the Arab world. )

There is one modest step Washington could take to show its faith that the road map's final destination is achievable within a foreseeable future. It would not solve many of Mr Abbas's problems. It would not be a guarantee against a return of the cycle of violence. But it would at least lend some degree of international credibility to the vision Mr Abbas is pursuing. And that would be for Mr Bush to outline, and in writing, the concessions he expects Israel to make in any such final settlement - especially on borders and the division of Jerusalem - in the manner that he so spectacularly assured Mr Sharon in Washington last April he expected from the Palestinians.

So far he has shown no clear sign of doing so. It may be that he shares the Israeli vision of a long-term interim "solution", one which surely invites the outbreak of a third intifada. Maybe, however, he has been persuaded that Mr Sharon's majority for disengagement from Gaza is so fragile that it would be imperilled by such a gesture, limited though it would be. After disengagement, assuming it is completed on time, there would be much less excuse.

If nothing else, the choice Mr Bush makes, and no later than the second half of the year, will be an instructive - though by no means exhaustive - test of whether all the warm words that will surely be uttered today, about helping Mr Abbas, have any lasting political meaning.