Leading article: The real implications of a bird flu pandemic

So what is the Government doing about it - and what should it do? Well, panic-prevention is undoubtedly something that ministers should be doing, and they are certainly making soothing and reassuring noises. The undisputed facts are that, although infected birds are now being found in Europe, the vast majority are in Asia. Even there, the deaths of only 60 people have been attributed to bird flu, and there has been no instance of human-to-human infection. If that happens, the probability is that it will start in Asia. Europe, to that extent, may have the luxury of - a little - time.

But there is a big difference between sensible panic-prevention and excessive confidence, even though they may find expression in similar words. And we have seen little evidence so far that the Government is getting to grips with what a bird flu pandemic would really mean. Stocks of Tamiflu, for instance, the only known form of prevention, will not reach the planned 14 million doses until September next year, and there seems nothing that anyone can do to speed that up.

The Health Secretary, Patricia Hewitt, told MPs yesterday that Britain was one of the top three countries in the world in terms of the precautions they were taking, along with France (which has 40 million doses of Tamiflu in place) and Australia (which ordered face masks, gloves and other surgical equipment to be delivered by this December). Australia placed its order with British companies, and it is not at all clear that they would be able to fill orders for the NHS as well.

This, we sincerely hope, is a concern the planners are addressing. The most immediate question is whether the Government can ensure that an outbreak of bird flu in Britain is detected and dealt with promptly. There must be widespread publicity about the threat; vigilance must be encouraged, and compensation must be in place so that poultry-keepers whose flocks may have to be slaughtered have no incentive to conceal infected birds. This is a lesson learnt from BSE.

While bird flu cannot be contracted through eating infected poultry, those who handle birds are at risk. Domestic ducks present a particular threat: they carry the disease, but do not die of it. Separate warnings will have to be issued about handling them; at worst, a national cull of ducks might be necessary.

If the worst happens, have the implications of a pandemic been thought through? Even if 14 million doses of Tamiflu were available, this would cover only a quarter of the population. Who, beyond frontline health workers, would be given priority? And how would distribution be organised? What contingency plans are there for the event that large numbers of NHS and local council staff are absent and medical facilities are swamped? And what provision is there for issuing mass advice to the public? Local health trusts are supposed to have plans to cope with a pandemic, but it is not at all certain that plans in all authorities are complete.

Sir Liam Donaldson is expected to announce an update to the Government's contingency plans for bird flu on Thursday. We await what he has to say with considerable interest, but also with concern. Britain may be among the best prepared. But everything we have learnt so far suggests that this is a reflection less of our own Government's farsightedness than of the lamentable lack of preparedness of others.