Leading Article: Russia's power must be limited

THE Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, has now uttered a truth that many will find unwelcome. The Russian Federation will have to rethink its relations with the United States and its Nato allies in order to 'avoid surprises'.

Mr Kozyrev, it seems, has in mind the recent air attack against Bosnian Serb positions around the besieged Muslim enclave of Gorazde, an action legitimised by United Nations resolutions (themselves supported by Russia) and carried out in accordance with procedures of such wearisome detail and so endlessly negotiated that Russian diplomats can probably recite them off by heart. Only Mr Kozyrev is surprised.

It seems already a forgotten age when this same Russian foreign minister, who is liberal, fluent and smart, entertained and appalled an international conference with his fictional speech depicting a caricatured Russian foreign policy replete with menace and folly.

Nowadays the entertainment is all from another quarter. It is provided by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, as he hurls flowerpots at demonstrators and issues threats to bomb this country or that, promising to subdue Russia's neighbours and to send forth her troops to bathe their tired feet in the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. But the laughter is ringing rather hollow.

It is taken for granted that Mr Zhirinovsky and his substantial following exercise great influence over a weak, unstable Russian government. President Yeltsin and his circle nurture an immature democracy. They are battling half- heartedly against economic collapse. They face a deep growl of hate and resentment from the lower depths of their blighted society, an upsurge of loathing channelled either to support old Communists or new fascists. There will be little room for men of Mr Kozyrev's urbanity in a new Russia ruled by such individuals.

The father of containment, George Kennan, observed that it was up to the West to set the limits of Soviet power because the Soviet Union itself recognised no limits. Stripped of its global ideology, modern Russia has reverted to Tsarist aspirations, but the same technique should firmly be maintained. It is clear that the West and Russia share some vital interests. Nobody wants to see nuclear proliferation among rogue nations.

It is preferable, if not ideal, to see a Russian peace reigning over the states of Central Asia rather than the writ of Iran. Ditto in the Transcaucasus. Free navigation through the Bosporus and peace between Greece and Turkey remain in everyone's interests. These themes may be conveyed to the elite that still carries out Russian foreign policy.

But it must also be acknowledged that a new streak of populism rules their choices. Therefore, a firm indication of the limits to Russian behaviour is needed. Nothing can be won for Western interests or Russian reform without making that clear. There should, indeed, be no surprises.