Leading Article: The real meaning of 'safe areas'

THE REALITY of the 'safe areas' of Bosnia is vividly described in two reports in this paper, from Robert Block and Marcus Tanner. They dispose of any remaining illusions that these areas can provide a lasting solution to the war. The term 'safe areas' has a cosy feel, suggesting happy peasants tilling the fields under the benevolent protection of the United Nations. In fact, these areas are abominations - politically, morally and physically.

One or two of the larger ones, such as Sarajevo, might eventually recover a measure of viability, but the rest will never be anything but squalid, overcrowded refugee camps entirely dependent on international aid for the foreseeable future. Existing communities have been swamped by incomers. Their adults will be unemployed; their children, now running wild, untrained for anything but terrorism. They will remain a chronic source of conflict; a scar on the face of Europe and a lasting reproach to the spineless confusion of that amorphous entity that likes to call itself the international community. They will also be very expensive to maintain.

To this accusation the signatories of last week's agreement in Washington reply that the 'safe areas' are not intended to be a solution but merely a temporary means of saving lives on the way to a political settlement. The trouble is that neither the Muslims, who are in despair; nor the Serbs, who are jubilant; nor officials in the chancelleries of the West believes this. The reason for their scepticism is that the plan was born out of failure to agree on anything more forceful. It was the refuge of weary negotiators whose aim at that stage was to preserve a facade of unity.

If Western governments want their protestations to be believed, they must start by proving themselves in three tests that lie ahead. First, the Serbs are saying that they do not want UN monitors on their border with Bosnia. The Security Council is expected to pass a resolution on the subject tomorrow. If it follows the Washington communique in leaving Belgrade with 'the prime responsibility' for closing the border, it must make clear by what means, and how determinedly, it intends to hold Belgrade to this responsibility. Legally, it does not need the consent of the Serbs since it could block the border from the Bosnian side, but that could mean asking UN troops to fight their way to the border.

The second test will come over the defence of the 'safe areas'. The Washington communique refers only to the defence of UN troops in these areas. But if the troops do not defend civilians, the term 'safe areas' becomes meaningless. Officials explain that UN troops are not equipped to repel full-scale assaults. In that case, they must react with sufficient force to any attacks on civilians to demonstrate that they will be backed up if necessary. A third test will be whether the UN is prepared to allow the Serbs to continue subjecting aid convoys to extended and humiliating negotiations. Without a secure right of access these areas will be little more than prison camps at the mercy of hostile forces.

In all these cases the issue is not only the welfare of the people of Bosnia, which is important enough, but also the authority of the United Nations. Each successful challenge guarantees that another will follow. At some point the process has to be halted.