Leading Article: Who should police Russia's periphery?

THE UNITED States is being gradually drawn into some of the complex ethnic and regional disputes of the former Soviet Union. In an interview with the Independent, published on page 7, Eduard Shevardnadze, the Georgian president, says that 'a lot of things might be done' in the way of American help in training military personnel. In fact, such help is already being provided, and may have provoked the recent murder of the CIA station chief in the republic.

The US is also taking a close interest in other parts of the Russian periphery, and has sent CIA advisers to visit some of them. A draft directive circulating in Washington outlines a role for the US as a broker in such disputes, and sets out conditions under which the US administration would support the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping forces within the area of the former Soviet Union. The paper was provoked in part by indications from Moscow that it would welcome help of this sort.

The US has very strong reasons for taking a close interest. Russia is a large nuclear power in the midst of a disintegrating empire. In the short term, the West needs to retain Russian co-operation in the UN Security Council, to stop Russian weaponry and expertise falling into the wrong hands, to save the area from becoming an economic disaster zone, and to discourage the Muslim areas from joining up with militant groups in the Middle East. In the longer term, Western security will gain huge benefits if Russia emerges from its turbulent transition as a friendly democratic power.

But how best to pursue these interests is not at all clear. Earlier this year, Boris Yeltsin asked the West to recognise Russia's 'special interests and responsibilities' in the area. In other words, he was seeking legitimation for a post-imperial role as regional policeman. Some of his nationalist opponents go further and make no secret of their desire to restore the empire, pressing hard on Mr Yeltsin to protect the 25 million ethnic Russians who live outside Russia.

Yet Russian military intervention in these disputes is also one of the main sources of tension. In Georgia, Russian forces are fighting with the Abkhaz minority against the government of Mr Shevardnadze. They are also helping the Armenians against Azerbaijan, and in many areas, including the Baltic republics, they are refusing to withdraw. How far they are acting independently of Moscow is often unclear.

For the West to support Russia in these disputes would look convenient in terms of power politics, but could be disastrous on the ground. Equally, support for dissident republics or minorities against Moscow could have even worse consequences. Hence Washington's attempt to present itself as a broker.

Given that there are more than 200 actual or potential conflicts in the former Soviet Union, there is no way the United States can exert more than modest influence. It is important, however, that the Western states should work together as closely and openly as possible in any endeavours of this sort. Too many secret missions by American agencies acting alone could foment more trouble than they avert.