What will life after war look like for Ukraine?

It took an actual war for the west to acknowledge that it was not prepared to risk WWIII for the sake of Ukraine, and for Ukraine to accept that reality too, writes Mary Dejevsky

Russia’s original objectives for the conflict were the ‘demilitarisation’ and the ‘denazification’ of Ukraine (Ukraine Presidency/AFP/Getty)

After three weeks of fighting, one of the many unusual aspects of Russia’s war in Ukraine is the near-daily juxtaposition of horror with hope. Even as Ukraine reported the bombing of the theatre in the besieged city of Mariupol, and the destruction of another block of flats outside the capital, Kyiv, high-level representatives from each side were claiming that the talks begun two weeks ago in Belarus were starting to bear fruit – and that the other side was now showing a more realistic attitude.

So much progress had apparently been made that a very specific 15-point peace plan was now said to be on the table, with its centrepiece a constitutional commitment by Ukraine to be a neutral state. The principle of neutrality having been conceded by Ukraine, among the points under discussion were now the terms of that neutrality. Would it take Sweden, or Austria, or Finland, perhaps, as a template? Would Ukraine retain its own armed forces? If so, what stated limits might there be on numbers, equipment and capability? What security guarantees might be given to Ukraine, and by whom?

Anything that entails Ukrainian neutrality has to be counted as a win for Russia. This has been Moscow’s central demand since long before it ditched diplomacy for military action. But neutrality does not now appear as much of a loss for Ukraine as it might once have done, especially not if the country retains its own armed forces.