Grenfell inquiry: Firefighter 'did not consider full evacuation' when families emerged covered in soot

Watch manager 'was so consumed in what was happening,' he tells investigation

​The firefighter who led the initial response to the Grenfell Tower fire did not consider a full evacuation of the tower, even when residents emerged coughing and with blackened faces, the public inquiry into the disaster has heard.

Watch manager Michael Dowden, who was incident commander at the scene the first hour of the blaze, said he was “consumed” by unfolding events and it was not apparent to him the fire had spread to other apartments in the building.

The inquiry, which is chaired by retired judge Sir Martin Moore Bick, also heard on Wednesday:

• The watch manager felt ‘helpless’ as he witnessed the flames climb up the building;
• Communications systems used by the firefighters were “unreliable” and Mr Dowden did not receive crucial messages during the first half-hour of the blaze;
• Fire chiefs who took charge after one hour were told “only the cladding from the outside was burning”;

Speaking about early hours of 14 June 2017, Mr Dowden told the hearing: “I don’t remember having a conscious thought in terms of ‘this has spread internally beyond the compartment’, I think because I was so consumed in terms of what was happening on the external of the building with the fire spread.”

In a high-rise fire, a stay-put policy has failed when a fire spreads beyond the compartment of origin.

According to fire safety expert Dr Barbara Lane, who examined the scene and submitted evidence to the inquiry, the policy failed by 1.26am. Residents were told to stay inside their flats until 2.47am, nearly two hours after the fire began.

The delay in evacuating the building is feared to have contributed to the death toll.

Mr Dowden recalled a father and son coming out of the tower who were covered in soot and appeared to be suffering the effects of fire inhalation shortly before 1.30am.

Richard Millett QC, counsel to the inquiry, asked if the sight made him consider evacuation. He said: “For me as an incident commander, the challenge we faced, an almost impossible situation trying to evacuate that building at that time with the resources in attendance. It is something I still search for today.”

The inquiry’s top lawyer then questioned him on whether he considered telling the control room what he has seen, so they could change the survival advice to emergency callers inside the tower.

He replied: “I have no thought at that moment in time, but from being an incident commander at that fire, at that moment in time, being witness to what was happening and unfolding in front of me – I had never operated at that level before.

“I was making decisions to the best of my ability with all good intentions to try to successfully resolve that incident and that was a decision I didn’t take at this time.”

But the sight of the fleeing residents shortly before 1.30am – coupled with a distinctive snaking movement of the fire – did make him call for more fire engines to come to the scene, bringing the total to 15, he told the hearing.

Mr Dowden, a watch manager, would usually only oversee fires requiring up to four fire engines, the inquiry heard on Tuesday. A more senior ranking officer was delayed in getting to the scene by road closures, according to information supplied by the London Fire Brigade (LFB) to the inquiry.

A note written by Mr Dowden in the immediate aftermath of the blaze that was shown to the probe revealed he felt “helpless” as watched the fire spread to the top floors of the tower.

“All my experience had now gone out of the window, [it was a] very daunting moment, I felt helpless,” the note said.

On Wednesday, Mr Dowden told the inquiry: “There probably was moments I did feel helpless, it is a very difficult place to be as an incident commander when it is just relentless.”

Earlier in the hearing, he said he did not receive crucial information during the first half-hour of the deadly blaze, despite other firefighters saying they sent him messages on their radios.

Updates were supposed to be relayed to Mr Dowden on the ground floor from officers at the so-called “bridgehead” – a safe space two floors below the flat on fire – but few arrived, the inquiry heard.

Mr Millett asked the watch manager about individual messages firefighters said they sent Mr Dowden.

Mr Millett asked: “Did crew manager (Chris) Secrett tell you that firefighters (Jamal) Stern and (Richard) Hippel looked ‘spooked’ and there was something amiss or wrong?”

The officer replied: “I have not received that information, no.”

The lawyer asked whether he received communications about what Mr Hippel had found on his visits to the tower’s higher floors.

“I don’t remember receiving any traffic or information,” Mr Dowden replied.

Mr Millett said: “Do you recall him telling you he had found black smoke on the 16th floor?”

The officer replied: “I have no recollection if it was face-to-face or radio traffic received.”

Other messages that did not reach Mr Dowden were that the lobbies on the ground, fifth and sixth floors contained smoke. There was also a report of “smoke-logging on the bridgehead on the second floor”, Mr Millett said.

London Fire Brigade policy repeatedly mentions the importance of maintaining effective communication channels, so incident commanders are “aware of the developing situation”.

Some breathing apparatus suits had radios built into them – called breathing apparatus radio interface equipment (Barie). But Mr Dowden said “they can be unreliable”.

These issues were “well known in the London Fire Brigade” before the night of the fire, he said.

Mr Dowden said although he did not remember the messages, he did not seek to “discredit” his colleagues’ accounts.

Later, Mr Millett said two fire officers that took over as incident command managers recalled Mr Dowden telling them the fire was only on the outside of the building.

Station manager Andy Walton relieved Mr Dowden of the incident commander role and passed it on immediately to deputy assistant commissioner Andrew O’Loughlin at 1.50am.

Mr Millett said: “Both Andy Walton and DAC O’Loughlin say in their statements they understood from you that only the cladding from the outside was burning, falling off, and the fire was only on the exterior – was that something you told them?”

Mr Downden replied: “It was obvious from that time in the incident there was an external fire on the building from the way it developed so quickly, but I cannot confirm that was something I actually handed over to them.”

Mr Dowden finished giving evidence on Wednesday after three days in front of the inquiry panel, during which he was overcome with emotion at many points.

At the end of the hearing, Sir Martin thanked the Mr Dowden, praising his “courage and candour” and saying he did not shy away from “difficult questions of which im afraid their have been many”.

Sir Martin later clarified his statements, apparently responding to criticism. “I understand that there may be a certain amount of concern and misunderstanding about the remarks which I addressed to Mr Dowden at the end of his evidence,” he said.

“I have to say I am surprised and disappointed that this should be so. I would hope that it went without saying that my remarks did mot in any sense prejudice my views on the issues.”

The inquiry also came under fire on Wednesday afternoon from the Fire Brigade Union, which released a statement saying the line of questioning had been “absurd”.

“There clearly are important and difficult questions to ask but they should not be directed at those who do not have the power or authority to have altered policies, operational procedures or training. The line of questioning toward Mike Dowden has been, at times, absurd,” the statement said.

“The Grenfell Tower Inquiry is approaching issues back to front. It is self evident that the disaster at Grenfell Tower was a result of the building having been altered. While there have been expert reports provided on these issues, the inquiry is looking at the events of the night rather than the decisions which led to it.

“Those who made the decisions have yet to been called to give evidence. If the ‘Stay put’ approach failed, it failed as soon as flammable cladding was installed on the building. The alterations to Grenfell Tower happened before the fire and before any firefighting took place.The order of the inquiry is chronologically and causally wrong.”

The inquiry will continue at 9.30am on Thursday, when other firefighters who attended the scene of the fire will give evidence.