What happens now to Rishi Sunak’s Rwanda plan?

The prime minister is being assailed on all sides over what he hoped would be a flagship policy. Sean O’Grady examines his options

Rishi Sunak is under pressure from all elements of his own party (PA)

It may be a new-ish year, but the prime minister has some familiar old political problems to deal with, and none more troublesome than the Rwanda bill – or the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill, to give it its full title. It aims to establish in law that Rwanda is a safe country to send refugees, whatever anyone else says, thus negating any challenges on those grounds in British courts.

Having won an unexpectedly large majority last month for the formal second reading of the bill in the Commons, Rishi Sunak enjoyed some respite from the pressure various factions in his party had been exerting on him. But next week he will see more hand-to-hand parliamentary combat, and ructions are already underway…

What is the problem for Rishi Sunak?

Sunak is being assailed on all sides. The first PMQs of the new year picked up from the final session of last year, as Starmer deployed the lethal weapon of ridicule at Sunak by exploiting deep Tory divisions over migration. Starmer mischievously enquired of Sunak what happened to the ambitious backbencher who’d called the Rwanda plan a gimmick.

Now, a faction on the right of the party, led by ex-immigration minister and former Sunak ally Robert Jenrick, plans to table amendments to the Rwanda bill to eliminate the very last few possibilities of a deportee appealing to any court – in the UK or at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg – to review their case. The so-called “five families” on the right of the party, including the likes of Iain Duncan Smith, Liz Truss and Jacob Rees-Mogg, number about 100 in total and are certainly large enough to overturn Sunak’s nominal parliamentary majority of about 54. If Sunak is especially unlucky, factions on all sides could combine to defeat his legislation.

In the coming months, the government will be seen as unable to control its own parliamentary party, with the ensuing chaos reminiscent of the dog days of the Major and May administrations.

Why doesn’t Sunak just give backbench Tories what they want?

The government could “adopt” the amendments if it thinks the alternative is to lose a Commons vote or even the whole bill. But it would create a new problem: if Sunak appeases his right wing, then his centre-left MPs – also substantial in number – will rebel instead. The One Nation group, informally headed by Damian Green and numbering 106 MPs, has warned they’ll “snap” if Sunak reneges on the promise he made at the end of last year and goes further in denying judicial appeal.

In sticking with the Rwanda plan even after the Supreme Court ruled it unlawful, Sunak has created a political distraction for himself in a general election year. Ideally, such energy-draining scraps are best dealt with at the start of a parliament, if at all.

What if Sunak loses votes on the Rwanda bill?

It would be a failure of party management but could become inevitable, so irreconcilable are the various positions and so united are the opposition parties (aside from the Northern Ireland Democratic Unionists, who number eight). Sunak could threaten to call a general election and make the Rwanda bill a matter of confidence – a high-stakes gamble.

If Sunak did suffer significant defeats on the Rwanda bill, he would have to try and save it or suffer the humiliation of shelving it pending the election. He could also call a vote of confidence in his own government, which he’d easily win and thus buy himself another attempt at pushing the bill through the Commons. That’s the tactic John Major had to use to get his Maastricht bill passed, but he had the benefit of some opposition support. The Rwanda bill would have to get past some stiff resistance in the House of Lords, especially because it wasn’t mentioned in the 2019 manifesto and thus lacks an explicit democratic mandate. It also remains open to judicial review at any point. Jenrick and his band of rebels even threaten to take the unusual step of voting the whole bill down at its final stage of parliamentary approval, the third reading – where passing legislation is normally a formality. In any event, for the government, it will all eat up precious time, energy and political capital.

Why is he doing it?

One obvious reason is that he rashly made “Stop the Boats” one of his five “people’s priorities”. He appears to be convinced that the real risk of being bundled onto a plane with a one-way ticket to Kigali will deter would-be migrants. He points to the success of the Albanian returns agreement as proof of the potency of the Rwanda scheme.

Another explanation is that he remains under intense scrutiny by the right of the party, some of whom still bear a grudge because of his role in the defenestrations of Boris Johnson and Liz Truss. Some of these backbenchers sincerely believe that the Rwanda plan will work (unlikely), is popular with their constituents (as suggested in public opinion polling), and thus will help save their seats (much less likely).

Fundamentally, it may be just that Sunak is being stubborn, doesn’t like losing, and is doubling down on a failed policy, like a gambler chasing his losses.

But does Sunak really believe in the Rwanda bill?

He certainly seems to now, if only because he’s become personally identified with it. But as Keir Starmer has gleefully pointed out at Prime Minister’s Questions, Sunak had voiced scepticism, if not scorn, while he was a backbencher and chancellor. After all, it was very much the project of erstwhile home secretary Priti Patel and premier Boris Johnson. Sunak could have quietly dropped it after entering Downing Street in 2022 but he chose to persevere despite its modest prospective impact, huge cost and doubtful legality.