'Saddam destroyed his weapons with the aim of getting rid of UN sanctions'

Time and time again, like a mantra, Charles Duelfer repeats throughout each section of his painstaking report that there is "no evidence" that Saddam Hussein possessed chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

Time and time again, like a mantra, Charles Duelfer repeats throughout each section of his painstaking report that there is "no evidence" that Saddam Hussein possessed chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

But the chief US weapons inspector in Iraq also warns systematically in each section, that given the opportunity, which would have come with the lifting of UN sanctions, the Iraqi dictator was poised to resume his banned weapons activities.

"There is an extensive, yet fragmentary and circumstantial body of evidence suggesting that Saddam pursued a strategy to maintain a capability to return to WMD after sanctions were lifted by preserving assets and expertise," Mr Duelfer says.

The report is divided into six chapters, covering the period from June 2003, when the group was set up under CIA special adviser David Kay, until September 2004.

Introduction

The report's introduction presents a historical view of the regime which describes how Saddam decided to embark on the weapons programmes that would eventually lead to his overthrow. "WMD demonstrated its worth to Saddam," Mr Duelfer says.

Until 1991, "Saddam's experience with WMD previously had been very positive," it says, referring to his use of gas against the Iranians during the 1984-88 war. "Iraqis believe that their possession and willingness to use WMD [chemical and biological weapons] contributed substantially in deterring the United States from going to Baghdad in 1991."

But then, in 1991, Saddam "decided to beat a tactical retreat. He resolved to eliminate the existing stocks of WMD during the course of the summer of 1991 in support of the prime objective of getting rid of sanctions" imposed by the UN after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and which were linked to the elimination of Iraq's WMD programme.

According to Mr Duelfer: "Virtually no senior Iraqi believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever."

Indeed, "evidence suggests that, as resources became available and the constraints of sanctions decayed, there was a direct expansion of activity that would have the effect of supporting WMD reconstitution".

By 1998, with the discovery that Iraq had weaponised the lethal VX nerve gas, Baghdad appears to have concluded that there was no prospect of satisfying the UN inspection teams. Co-operation with the Unscom teams was seen as a trap, not a path to ending sanctions.

As confrontations with the UN intensified during 1998, the report suggests that a secret resolution was adopted by the regime, "to sever compliance with all UN resolutions".

The break of trust led to the withdrawal of the UN weapons inspectors which was followed by the four-day Desert Fox bombing campaign by Britain and America which divided the UN Security Council.

In 2000, Saddam looked like he was on to a winner as the sanctions gradually eroded.

But then came the attacks of 11 September 2001. The report says: "The progress Baghdad had made towards escaping sanctions changed following 11 September. Saddam did not immediately understand this." He had miscalculated again. According to Mr Duelfer he only understood the impact of 11 September after President Bush's state of the union speech in January 2002 in which Iraq was branded part of the "axis of evil."

Saddam eventually agreed to let the inspectors back. Surrounded by the massive military build-up, Saddam realised his position, but it was "far too late".

Regime's strategic intent

According to senior regime officials interviewed by the Iraq Survey Group, Saddam encouraged them to preserve the scientific "brains trust" that would allow Iraq to reactivate its banned weapons programmes at a moment's notice.

Former deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz notably said that Saddam "wanted people to keep knowledge in their heads rather than retain documents that could have been exposed."

Saddam's former science adviser, Jaafar Drya Hashim is quoted as saying that Saddam would reconstitute "all WMD disciplines when sanctions were lifted". But Mr Hashim added that "he never heard Saddam say this explicitly".

The report says that some of the former regime officials contended that "nuclear weapons would have been important - if not central - components of Saddam's future WMD force."

Delivery systems

Mr Duelfer says that the ISG had uncovered Iraqi plans or designs for three long-range ballistic missiles in contravention of the UN sanctions, which forbade Iraq from developing missiles with a range of more than 150km. But "none of these systems progressed to production, and only one reportedly passed the design phase," he said.

The report admits that the 1991 Gulf war, followed by years of UN inspections, "brought many of Iraq's delivery system programmes to a halt". Mr Duelfer says that "while much of Iraq's long-range missile inventory and production infrastructure was eliminated, Iraq until late 1991 kept some items hidden to assist future reconstitution of the force."

The report says that the ISG "has uncovered no evidence Iraq retained Scud-variant missiles", but warns that Saddam had kept scientists and technicians employed within the constraints of the UN monitoring system "for a potential breakout capability".

It also says that there had been some procurement towards expanding delivery systems programmes following the departure of the UN weapons inspectors in 1998. At that time, Iraq "hired outside expertise," the report says, without giving further details.

Mr Duelfer also warned that in his view, "Saddam clearly intended to reconstitute long-range delivery systems and that the systems were potentially for WMD."

Nuclear weapons

Iraq never succeeded in building a nuclear weapon, and the UN effectively shut down its clandestine programme in the mid-1990s. So the issue remains whether Saddam intended to resume nuclear activities with a view to building a bomb.

The ISG discovered "further evidence of the maturity and significance of the pre-1991 Iraqi nuclear programme, but found that Iraq's ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons programme progressively decayed after that date."

The report says that "the ISG found a limited number of post-1995 activities that would have aided the reconstitution of the nuclear weapons programme once sanctions were lifted".

Chemical weapons

The report says that "while a small number of old abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991".

However, it adds that Saddam conserved the knowledge and know-how to resume production at any time. Iraq retained "the capability to weaponise CW agent when the need arose."

The report also revealed that the ISG had uncovered information that the Iraqi intelligence service had maintained from 1991-2003 "a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations", and not as weapons of mass destruction.

But the report added that there was "no evidence that scientists were producing CW or BW agents in these labs".

The group reports that by the end of 1991 "Iraq destroyed almost all prohibited weapons at that time". It says that it has "obtained no evidence that contradicts our assessment that the Iraqis destroyed most of their hidden stockpile, although we recovered a small number of pre-1991 chemical munitions in early to mid-2004."

It added: "Those remaining pre-1991 weapons either escaped destruction in 1991 or suffered only partial damage. More may be found in the months and years ahead." But the report made clear that it was only talking of small amounts.

Biological weapons

The report fails to prove the existence of mobile biological weapons units. But Mr Duelfer writes: "Though we have conducted an extensive investigation and we have a paucity of confirmatory information, there is still some possibility that such a capability did exist."

This section in the report admits that "in practical terms", with the destruction of the al-Hakam facility by the UN in 1996, "Iraq abandoned its ambition to obtain advanced BW weapons quickly". The survey group "found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW programme or was conducting BW-specific work for military purposes".

It adds that Iraq "would have faced great difficulty in re-establishing an effective BW agent production capability". But that said, Mr Duelfer adds that "Iraq still possessed its most important BW asset, the scientific know-how of its BW cadre".

Procurement and financing

The oil for food humanitarian programme set up by the UN in order to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people from the UN sanctions had "ample opportunities for corruption", the report noted. Iraq was allowed to sell limited amounts of oil in return for food and medicine to help its people. But oil price differentials "could be pocketed by whatever trader designated to lift Iraqi oil". Saddam was levying an "illegal surcharge on every barrel."

Mr Duelfer details how, in order to maintain support among the powerful permanent members of the UN Security Council, "the former regime ensured that Chinese, French and Russian energy firms, as well as others representing states sympathetic to Iraq, were prominent recipients of oil contracts." The report repeats allegations that "sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council." France and Russia are singled out.

How the experts misunderstood Saddam

David Kay, the first CIA adviser sent by President George Bush to track down Iraq's missing weapons of mass destruction after the war, famously admitted "we were all wrong" when he failed to find a single "shining weapon".

Charles Duelfer, who replaced Mr Kay, takes pains in his own report to make sure that everybody now understands how the weapons experts, including himself, got it all wrong.

The chief US weapons inspector is forced to admit that Saddam's regime may have understood the West and its agents better than the West understood Iraq. The major difference with Mr Kay's interim report is that the Duelfer report gives a detailed insight into Saddam's regimethanks to interviews with the Iraqi leader himself and other jailed aides.

Mr Duelfer, who when he was deputy chief UN weapons inspector in the 1990s had stressed the importance of documents in analysing the Iraqi threat, now says the opposite. "Analysts should not expect to find extensive documents or parliamentary records reflecting Saddam's decisions on WMD. The regime simply did not operate that way. Implicit guidance may exist and be of equal or greater importance than explicit direction. What seems clear is that WMD was a tool of power or leverage that varied in its utility in advancing toward his goals for himself and Iraq."

He also advances important caveats in interpreting the stream information now coming out of Iraq from imprisoned members of the Iraqi regime. Some may be trying to save their own skins by saying what the American-led Iraq Survey Group wants to hear - just like the Iraqi defectors may have done in the run-up to the Iraq war.

Anne Penketh

'I HAVE NO DOUBT WE WILL FIND EVIDENCE OF WMD ...'

Tony Blair, 25 February 2003, House of Commons

"The biological agents we believe Iraq can produce include anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. All eventually result in excruciatingly painful death."

Tony Blair, 18 March 2003, House of Commons

"Iraq continues to deny that it has any WMD, though no serious intelligence service anywhere in the world believes them... We are asked now seriously to accept that in the last few years - contrary to all history, contrary to all intelligence - Saddam decided unilaterally to destroy those weapons."

Tony Blair, 4 June 2003, House of Commons

"I have no doubt [the Iraq Survey Group] will find the clearest possible evidence of weapons of mass destruction."

Tony Blair, 8 July 2003, evidence to Commons Liaison Committee

"I don't concede it at all that the intelligence at the time was wrong.

Tony Blair, 25 January 2004, interview with The Observer

"It is absurd to say in respect of any intelligence that it is infallible, but ...I believe the intelligence was correct, and I think in the end we will have an explanation."

Tony Blair, 6 June 2004, BBC Radio 4 Today programme

"We know he had them [WMD] because he used them and that's why we had 10 years of UN resolutions about Saddam and WMD ...

"Now let the survey group complete its work and give us the report ... They will not report that there was no threat from Saddam, I don't believe."

Tony Blair, 6 July 2004, evidence to Commons Liaison Committee

"I have to accept we haven't found them [WMD] and we may never find them. They could have been removed. They could have been hidden. They could have been destroyed."

Tony Blair, 14 July 2004, statement on the Butler report

"I have to accept, as the months have passed, it seems increasingly clear that at the time of invasion, Saddam did not have stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons ready to deploy."

Tony Blair yesterday

"Just as I accept that the evidence now is that there were no stockpiles of actual weapons ready to be deployed, others can be honest and accept that the report shows that sanctions were not working."