George Bush: 'I was comfortable to take the shot at Saddam'

This is an edited extract of President George Bush's interview with Tom Brokaw of NBC News

Tom Brokaw: Let's talk about that first night, when you surprised us all by launching the pre-emptive strike against the residence of Saddam Hussein.

George Bush: I thought I was pretty well through with the day, until 3.40pm that afternoon, when I got a call from Secretary Rumsfeld that said, Mr President, the plans have changed. He said 'I would like to change the plans, I need your permission to change the plans. Can I come over?' He didn't say, 'the plans had changed', but I knew what he told me on the phone, it would mean the plans would have changed. And that is, we had a shot at Saddam Hussein, they thought.

So I assembled the national security team of the Vice- President, Colin Powell, Rumsfeld, Myers, CIA Tenet, Condi Rice, Andy Card and some other CIA agents there – some guys I hadn't seen before came in the Oval. And the reason why they were there is they had a source on the ground that was convinced that not only would Saddam Hussein be in the complex, but Uday and Qusay, his two sons, would be there as well. And they explained why this was the case. And basically they were asking permission from me to launch an air strike.

I was hesitant at first, to be frank with you, because I was worried that the first pictures coming out of Iraq would be a wounded grandchild of Saddam Hussein – but Saddam Hussein, who was not there at the time we started making the decision, would never show up – that the first images of the American attack would be death to young children.

And this is an interesting moment, because as time went on during the day, or that evening, the intelligence got richer and richer. In other words, the guy on the ground was calling in to the Centcom headquarters, who was immediately calling in to the White House more and more information.

For example, he discovered that there was a bunker a hundred feet away from one of the houses – a bunker that had so much concrete and was likely to house Saddam when he arrived, and his kids, his boys.

And as the intelligence got richer, I got more confident with the notion that Saddam would, in fact, be there. And at 7.15pm that evening, I gave the order for Tommy to proceed with an attack on the farms, but changed – they had an ordnance package of 30 cruise missiles. But because of the bunker they had to change the timing of the attack so that the Stealth bomber went in first, unloaded his ordnance and then the TLAMs, or the cruise missiles would follow in behind.

Which means they had to reprogramme all these missiles. And they didn't have much time to do it because the flight time of the missiles from their particular launch sites was about two hours.

TB: Did you watch that on television, when the bombs began to land?

GB: Yes, I did. But what was interesting, Tom, I don't think many people know this, is that the game plan was to move Special Ops forces early, at noon that day. And we would have explained to the country, as kind of creating the conditions for the battlefield, so that when our troops moved significantly their conditions would be ripe for success.

At Friday, at noon, I was going to address the nation about the air campaign, and the ground campaign would follow shortly thereafter. Turns out that because we conducted the air raid, I had to speak that night to the country. And then Tommy said he was going to move the ground force movement up early to secure oilfields and to move as quickly as possible into Iraq – which really says that he had the ability and the authority and the flexibility necessary to change a war plan to meet the needs on the ground.

TB: That human intelligence that we had on the ground, did you hear back from him, I presume?

GB: We did.

TB: And did he . . . ?

GB: He felt like we got Saddam.

TB: He did?

GB: He felt like that, yes. And we're trying, of course, to verify. And before there's any declaration, of course, there will be a lot of evidence.

TB: Did you see that famous television video of Saddam the next day, in the glasses, reading out from the notepad and so on?

GB: Well, yes. I was amused by that, almost as amused by that as I was his PR man – it was one of the classics – probably helping NBC Saturday Night Live out mightily, but through his – it was just unbelievable what he was saying. But, you know, the people that wonder if Saddam Hussein is dead or not, there's some evidence that says, suggests, he might be. We would never make that declaration until we were more certain. But the person that helped direct the attacks believes that Saddam, at the very minimum, was severely wounded.

TB: That night?

GB: At night, yes. And it explains – again, there will be a lot of speculation until the truth is known, but it explains why, for example, one reason why dams weren't blown up or oilfields weren't destroyed – even though we found them to be wired with – potentially to be blown up.

TB: As you know, there's still a lot of scepticism around the world about American motives in Iraq.

GB: Right.

TB: But it is important to find the weapons of mass destruction, or the evidence that he had a massive programme under way, isn't it?

GB: Yes. I think we will. I'm pretty confident we will.

TB: Let me ask you about the future of some other relationships that we have, with the United Nations, for example.

GB: Well, I would hope that the UN would be useful. I would hope that the UN would be an effective body at helping deal with the new threats of the 21st century, dealing with terror and terrorist states and proliferation of weapons.

The United Nations will have a useful role in the reconstruction of Iraq, for example, because a lot of nations won't be able give reconstruction money without a UN conduit. And there is a role in this case for the United Nations. I hope, as threats emerge, the United Nations will be more responsive to those threats.

TB: There used to be an American doctrine about when we go to war it's overwhelming force. Now it's speed and flexibility, based on Iraq, and instant communication.

GB: Well, the instant communications part was one of the reasons why I was comfortable in giving Tommy Franks and the commanders in the field the go-ahead to take the shot at Saddam Hussein on the first day. Because there in the Oval Office we were getting near-instant feedback from eyes on the ground what he was seeing, what he felt the conditions were like.

It was an amazing moment to think that a person risking his life, viewing the farms, watching the entries, seeing, observing what was taking place inside one of Saddam's most guarded facilities, was able to pick up a device, call Centcom, and Centcom would call us in near real-time.

TB: I don't want you to give up sources and methods, but the guy who called in the first time – still with us?

GB: Yes, he is. He is with us. Thank God. A brave soul.

TB: And what about the Iraqi Information Minister, (Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf)?

GB: He's my man, he was great. [Laughter].

Somebody accused us of hiring him and putting him there. He was a classic.