Experts predict how the Ukrainian war could end

There are currently three plausible scenarios, Daniel Romera Mejías and Waldimeiry Correa da Silva write

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a turning point in European and global geopolitics, challenging the foundations of the post-Cold War security order. Three years into the conflict, the European Union today faces a variety of scenarios that could redefine not only Ukraine’s future, but also the EU’s role and influence on the international stage.

The conflict has highlighted the limitations of EU foreign and security policy, underlining Europe’s dependence on transatlantic alliances and its vulnerabilities to crisis in its immediate neighbourhood.

In this context, it is crucial to analyse the possible outcomes of the conflict, focusing on the three most plausible scenarios at this point in time.

Donald Trump’s recent re-election adds a layer of complexity to the EU’s security dilemma, in addition to the trade challenge.

Washington has stepped up contacts with Moscow to explore possible deals without the EU or Ukraine. Although US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said Brussels and Kyiv will be included when the negotiations are serious, this assertion highlights a fundamental fact: it is still the US deciding when and how Europe can intervene in the resolution of a conflict that directly affects its territory.

This exclusion from Russia-US negotiations in Saudi Arabia weakens European influence and could result in agreements that run counter to its interests. Moreover, the possible American demand for economic concessions, such as access to Ukrainian rare earth minerals, aggravates tensions by compromising European industrial and technological security.

This situation reflects patterns from the Cold War, when Washington defined European security without real European involvement. Although European leaders have convened emergency meetings to reinforce their position, their efforts seem more a reaction than a strategy of real autonomy, leaving their ability to influence the outcome of the conflict in doubt.

Residents of Ukraine’s Odesa stand outside a clinic that was hit by a Russian strike (Reuters)

The second scenario poses a complex set of challenges for Brussels. Traditionally, Nato membership has been seen as a sort of complement to EU membership, which has not developed its defensive capabilities. That’s because the transatlantic alliance is seen as providing a collective security framework that reinforces regional stability, leaving a Ukraine within the EU in a sort of grey zone.

Likewise, rebuilding the country would represent a huge economic challenge for a continent already threatened by recession. Although trust funds exist, it is highly likely that Brussels will shoulder much of the financial burden, as it has done so far with the mobilisation of €134 billion.

The dilemma for the EU is clear: if it accepts Ukraine’s accession without a solid security framework, it risks taking on a huge economic and political responsibility with no guarantee of stability in the region.

If, on the other hand, it tries to link this accession to stronger security commitments such as an increased European military presence on Ukrainian territory, it could face a direct clash with Moscow.

In any case, the accession process will be long and complex, which would give Brussels some breathing space to consider a more proactive role in defence and security.

Prolonging the war in Ukraine remains a realistic scenario, threatening EU stability, exacerbating social inflation and discontent, making unity around sanctions against Russia and support for Kyiv more difficult.

Moreover, the already manifest shift in US policy under the Trump administration, with reduced or conditional support for Ukraine, would force Brussels to take a more active role in military and economic assistance, a burden it has hitherto shared, albeit unevenly, with Washington.

There has been a shift in US policy on Ukraine since Trump took power (AP)

The UK’s proposal to send troops to Ukraine introduces a variable that could redefine Europe’s role in the conflict. While this initiative does not have the explicit backing of Brussels (pending the outcome of the summit of European leaders in Paris), it does reflect the growing pressure on the EU to assume greater responsibility for regional stability.

This would open the door to a new scenario, never explored by the EU, which at present seems unlikely.

The president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, stated that Europe can no longer outsource its security, but whether it is ready to do so remains in doubt, given the reluctance of states to relinquish control over their armed forces.

Amid geopolitical reconfiguration, the EU must take the lead in building a new security order based on a community defence that guarantees strategic autonomy and stability. While we do not know how many meetings, summits or forums will be necessary before European leaders reach this conclusion, Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky’s warning in Davos is clear: “Putin does not fear Europe” and Europe must learn to defend itself.

Daniel Romera Mejías is a Researcher at the Department of Public International Law and International Relations, University of Seville

Waldimeiry Correa da Silva is a Distinguished Researcher EMERGIA at the Department of Public International Law and International Relations, University of Seville

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article