Britain took a moral approach on Iraq

THE SCOTT REPORT

The Scott report is prodigious in length and the Government is rightly giving MPs 10 days before they debate it. Humility is required from a lot of people. First from those who, whether in Parliament, the media or elsewhere have made outrageous allegations of a scurrilous nature that ministers behaved dishonourably, with impropriety and as part of a conspiracy. Scott dismisses such sweeping allegations against individual ministers. Let those who made such allegations reflect on their behaviour.

Second, those of us in Government in the Eighties should take seriously Scott's general policy criticisms and consider carefully all his recommendations for policy changes. I, as the first witness in the three-year inquiry, have made strong criticisms of its nature and the way it has been conducted. I did have strong reservations about this, but I believe Sir Richard Scott has done his utmost to be fair, though I do not agree with all his judgements.

Some may have forgottenwhy the Prime Minister established the inquiry in 1992. It focused on the very real anxiety that the Matrix Churchill prosecution could have led to the false imprisonment of businessmen due to the deliberate withholding of certain information by government ministers. There was no cover-up. That fear is well and truly dispelled and our minds can now focus on other issues.

Scott is critical of the Government for undervaluing the importance of full disclosure of information to Parliament. This brings up the issue of open government. In recent years there has been a much greater disclosure of information by government, not least through the select committee system. It is in the interest of any government to disclose information as fully as possible to support and explain its policies and decisions.

However, when it comes to foreign policy, and particularly issues such as arms sales, openness can quite easily conflict with what ministers judge to be the national interest or matters of commercial confidentiality. This was evident in the case of the introduction for the so- called 1984 Howe guidelines, which were not fully disclosed for a year since I and many other ministers felt that it could have damaged British commercial interests in the Gulf to have done so earlier.

If disclosure is likely to damage our country and deprive people of jobs, then surely we must protect our interests and withhold information? I would welcome a serious debate on this issue. Even in the US, where there is the 1974 Freedom of Information Act, there are provisions to exclude matters contrary to the national interest. Most other countries would not dream of disclosing information about arms sales. Moreover, previous Labour and Conservative administrations had followed the convention of not imparting detailed information to Parliament.

It is totally right that we should carefully absorb any lessons to be learnt from this inquiry. Not least of the issues for any government of any complexion is the need to establish inquiries with carefully and tightly-drawn terms of reference and procedures which are clearly seen to be fair to all sides. In this particular case, the inquiry would have been shorter and sharper if the terms of reference had been more tightly drawn and if experts in international relations and parliamentary affairs had been available to Sir Richard as assessors.

Lord Franks's 1982 inquiry on the invasion of the Falkland Islands, which was completed in six months, demonstrated how much more valuable it is for the inquiry chairman to act as an independent seeker of the truth, rather than as a prosecuting advocate.

Finally, do let us keep our sense of perspective. Many people abroad do think the British are fairly barmy the way we flagellate ourselves. America, France, Russia and many other countries were flogging lethal defence equipment as hard as they could during the Iran-Iraq war - particularly to Iraq. We took the view that it was wholly wrong to stoke up the war. We produced guidelines which ensured that we did not sell any equipment to either side which could be used to prolong or exacerbate the conflict. Here we were pursuing the right policy; the approach which is both moral and in Britain's interest. We sacrificed jobs on the grounds of morality and the national interest.

All this shows ministers balancing conflicting interests with care and conscientiousness. This is the real world in which we live. I firmly believe in ministerial accountability. I resigned in 1982 with Lord Carrington as a matter of honour, following the invasion of the Falkland Islands. In this case, however, I do not believe there is any justification for any resignations.

The writer was Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 1983-85