An alternative strategy for handling Saddam

We knew about his brutality but, during our talks, I was struck by his quiet voice and diplomatic courtesies

I am writing this staring at the photograph on my desk of me with a beaming Saddam Hussein. He is dressed in his trademark military fatigues – complete with gun in holster – and is grasping me by the hand as he is introduced to me by the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz. The year was 1989 and I was on a parliamentary junket, with five other Labour and Tory MPs, that took in Kuwait, Bahrain and Iraq. Relations with Iraq were somewhat tense, but we still had full diplomatic relations and were heaving a sigh of relief that Iran, which was then world public enemy number one, was being contained by Iraq.

It was a profitable trip, not least because of the presentation of an expensive gift of a Baume and Mercier watch to each of us by the Emir of Bahrain (all we got from Saddam was a box of Turkish delight). But we did negotiate the release of a British businessman who was being held in an Iraqi jail. Our embassy and Tariq Aziz had, of course, already done much of the preparatory work, but it was clear that Saddam would take the final decision. I recall our ambassador, briefing us beforehand, making the point that Saddam liked to be flattered by the personal and direct appeal. Maybe that is a characteristic of dictators who tend to be isolated and who rarely get face-to-face meetings with other world leaders.

Iraq was still in the grip of the conflict with Iran. Baghdad reminded me of a scene from films about the First World War. Thousands of soldiers with knapsacks roamed around the main railway station. We were encouraged to make a pilgrimage to the gigantic war memorial where we laid a wreath. The country has been on a war footing for decades.

Of course we knew vaguely about Saddam's brutality, but during our discussions I was struck by his quiet voice and diplomatic courtesies. In that meeting we wanted a prisoner released, and it was clear that raving to him about atrocities was not going to get us very far. Suffice to say that we came away, as well as the prisoner release, with the thought that he was a shrewd negotiator and was far from mad.

This conclusion was also reached a year later by Sir Edward Heath after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. His view is that diplomatic as well as military solutions should always be investigated. He was roundly castigated for his views that were interpreted as being akin to the appeasement of Hitler.

Sir Edward has always rejected comparisons between Saddam, before the Gulf War, and Hitler. Firstly, Saddam had neither Hitler's industrial power nor his military capability. Secondly, the entire international community was united against him and could act decisively against him, so we were negotiating from a position of strength. Above all, negotiation is not appeasement. Appeasement involves a sacrifice of a moral principle in order to avert aggression. Negotiation requires some change of the status quo in order to make progress without giving up any basic point of principle. This is the very stuff of diplomacy and, throughout history, negotiation has been the only peaceful way of resolving serious differences between nations.

Sir Edward's attitude towards Saddam played a decisive part in releasing the British hostages held in Iraq during the Gulf War. He is probably now the only western figure of standing to have any influence on Saddam. If Tony Blair really wants to strike a different pose from the warmongering of President Bush, Sir Edward could be his answer. Why not, if his health and stamina are up to it, call him in – complete with a Downing Street photocall which would be bound to be beamed on to Baghdad television – for a briefing on the situation? Then send him to Baghdad to act as a go-between. The diplomatic channels for conflict resolution have now become so poisoned that only the megaphone seems to be working. Embassies have been shut and there is now no opportunity for anybody to talk to anyone.

In his autobiography, Sir Edward details a conversation between himself, the Queen and the then US Secretary of State, James Baker, at a Buckingham Palace reception in November 1992. He reported: "I told him [Saddam] that, in his own interest, he should withdraw from Kuwait, failing which he would precipitate a major war with the US and other Western powers which would drive him out of Kuwait and greatly damage Iraq". Turning to Baker, he added, "that is what you should have done".

Of course, if the Tories were thinking laterally, they would also capitalise on their former leader and approach him before Mr Blair gets to him first. Think how dramatic it would be for Iain Duncan Smith to appoint Sir Edward as his special envoy to Baghdad. There is as little appetite on the Tory backbenches for engagement with the United States as there is among Labour MPs. Those such as the former Foreign Office minister, Douglas Hogg, and the grandee, Sir Peter Tapsell, are as horrified at such a prospect as Labour's Alice Mahon and George Galloway (whose understanding of the mind of Saddam should be regarded as an asset to be used by Mr Blair).

Sir Edward's view is that the Americans have never forgiven themselves for not having got rid of Saddam in the Gulf War. In the years since then he has been sustained as much by his formidable political skills as by the brutal methods he has used to reinforce his position. The parallel here is with the late President Nasser of Egypt, who was demonised by Britain.

The British, French and Israelis sought to destroy Nasser at Suez but he remained President of Egypt with the overwhelming support of his people, until his death 15 years later. One of the repeated lessons of history, says Sir Edward, is that even the most questionable regime can sustain itself if it can rally the people behind its cause, and no cause is more compelling than the loathing of the West in general and the United States in particular.

This is why the American adventure is doomed. Jordan and Saudi Arabia will not provide logistical support. Europe will not play any part, a view underlined by both Gerhard Schröder and Edmund Stoiber in the German election campaign. And the British public is queasy.

But the extraordinary systemic failure is of traditional international diplomacy. War now seems to be the first resort with an unwillingness to engage with Saddam. In some respects the West has failed to recognise that its treatment of Iraq during the past decade has been similar to the consequences that followed from the Treaty of Versailles after the First World War.

Whether Saddam is a bad man and has – or may soon have – the capacity to deliver to the US or London weapons of mass destruction is beside the point. We knew that the Soviet Union had such a capability for half a century, but we did everything possible to use international forums to avoid it. Even Reagan and Nixon dealt personally with Soviet leaders during the darkest days.

If pride – or stupidity – prevents Mr Bush or Mr Blair giving "jaw jaw" rather than "war war" (Churchill's dictum) a chance, let Sir Edward be the go-between.

mrbrown@pimlico.freeserve.co.uk