Lawrence Freedman: Tough strategic issues must be confronted

So far, this war is not unique, apart from the speed of advance. But soon the coalition will have to take risks to fight awkward enemy positions in the cities

It is depressing to wake each morning to the news of more British casualties caused, not by enemy fire, but by the standard hazards of all military operations – equipment malfunctions, confused movements, friendly fire. The friendly fire is particularly frustrating, because of the effort to develop systems to distinguish between friend and foe and reduce the possibility of air defences attacking their own aircraft. During the Falklands War, Argentine air defences took out a number of their own aircraft while, as a result of a communications failure, a British warship also on one occasion shot down a Gazelle helicopter.

One of the great achievements of the Gulf War was in avoiding this sort of incident, but that was the result of a complex process of designating tasks to aircraft in such a way that complaints were later made of a loss of operational flexibility. In 1991, the most notorious friendly fire incident came towards the close of the war when an American aircraft shot a missile into a British Warrior armoured car, killing nine of the occupants. The basic principle is that, the more the commanders are straining to respond to the complexity of the moment rather than follow through a pre-arranged plan, the more it is likely that different units will turn up at unexpected places and clash inadvertently.

That does not mean to say that yesterday's incident was a symptom of a campaign going awry. In a specific sense it reflected the jumpiness of the Patriot batteries after Iraqis have fired whatever missiles happened to be available across the border into Kuwait, and the fears of what the warheads might contain. In a larger sense this limp Iraqi effort indicates defiance but also some desperation.

The good news thus far is that the very worst cases have not yet come to pass: chemical weapons have not been used against Kuwait, Saudi Arabia or Israel, while the speed with which oilfields appear to have been secured, one of the main achievements so far, has reassured international markets that this war will not take out a huge chunk of oil capacity and has eased the long-term task of reconstructing Iraq. In addition, the accidental casualties have been thrown into relief because so few have been caused by direct Iraqi fire.

So the worst cases have yet to transpire, but nor have the best. It is clear that the bombing of Baghdad has been spectacular and precise. Given the lurid descriptions of Baghdad being "blitzed" on Friday night, the number of civilians the Iraqis claim have been killed and wounded (no figures were given for military personnel) was remarkably low. Indeed, by taking the wind out of the sails of the anti-war movement as it was about to denounce the coalition for its barbarity, the Iraqi Information Ministry did wonders for its own credibility. Yet the question remains whether there is much point in terrifying residents in order to land direct hits on empty buildings of symbolic political importance, or whether different parts of the Iraqi bureaucracy appreciate the messages supposedly being sent when one ministry is targeted rather than another.

At any rate, with a limited number of suitable targets still available to attack, one has to assume that this element will become less significant. It is probably already the case that the most important air targets left are not in Baghdad. It may be, as both General Franks and Air Marshal Burridge have asserted, that the Iraqi military's command and control is getting more problematic, although the regime's spell has yet to be broken.

There is no reason to doubt that those Iraqis now in coalition-controlled territory are mightily relieved and genuinely feel liberated. But it would also seem to be the case that the Iraqi people are unsure about taking great risks to liberate themselves. The fear of the regime's methods remains strong, and we are seeing among the Shias of the south the residual wariness of American and British promises to support their urge for freedom left over from the calamitous failure to support the March 1991 insurrection. This was followed by some dreadful slaughter by the regime, one of whose most vicious leaders has been put in charge of the south.

The conduct of the ground campaign has added to the sense that this is not yet truly a war of liberation. As with all wars these days, it is being heralded by the Pentagon as being unlike any other. It is so far not at all unique, other than in the speed of advance and the means being used to arrange the surrenders, with the leaflet drop being supplemented by mobile phones and e-mails.

A vastly superior occupying force is pushing past a weak and dispirited enemy en route to the capital where the most serious opposition is likely to be faced. The pressure to get the war over has meant that little effort has been made to consolidate the coalition position along the way, once the military have confidence that serious counter- attacks cannot be launched. Even with prisoners a readiness can be discerned to let the disarmed soldiers drift off home rather than become the responsibility of the coalition forces and thereby add to the burden of logistics.

The amount of the population being governed by the coalition is also still quite small. The hope appears to be in Basra and An-Nasiriyah that communications with senior Iraqis will allow for a peaceful entry into the town, but there does not appear to be a great rush. Humanitarian needs may force this issue, as part of the promise of the campain is that the coalition will look after Iraqi civilians caught up in the war. Despite the Iraqi capture of some American troops who got ahead of the main body of their force, and the report of hard fighting around An-Nasiriyah and Umm Qasr, it is important not to exaggerate the degree of resistance faced in the ground campaign thus far, especially in open country, for it still seems to have been largely isolated and spasmodic. The battle for Umm Qasr is instructive, in that the reasons for resistance appear to have been companies of the more committed troops of the regime being combined with the less enthusiastic. This leaves the poor Iraqi conscripts caught in the middle, with guns to their back and guns to their front. Resistance of this sort has been dealt with by coalition fire power coming down on any defended positions, but this method may not be available if the enemy has intermingled with the civilian population.

Nervousness is still palpable about the possibility that some Iraqi units may revert to a form of urban guerrilla warfare. This is going to leave coalition troops jumpy for some time to come but, without close co-operation between guerrilla fighters and the local population, the nuisance value of this sort of warfare is limited. It has added to the inherently cautious American approach to land warfare. Because of their superior firepower and command systems, they see no need to take risks.

Soon, Allied forces will reach the outskirts of Baghdad and then the difficult strategic issues will have to be faced – it will no longer be possible to circumvent and ignore awkward enemy positions. As we saw in Afghanistan, once a collapse begins it can be very sudden. Dissident or just scared elements among the ruling élite may act, or mutinous feelings may spread among those on the front line, especially as Iraqi claims that the enemy is being beaten back have self-evidently lost contact with reality. The key trigger is likely to be proximity of Allied troops and evidence that, if necessary, they are resolved to fight their way into Baghdad.

The writer is professor of war studies at King's College, London