Mary Dejevsky: America's plan to invade Iraq is just a giant bluff

The whole edifice rests on the premise, more readily accepted in Europe, that Bush is a gun-toting bully

For the umpteenth time this year, informed opinion on both sides of the Atlantic is working itself into a panic about an imminent American assault on Iraq. By my approximate count, we have now been treated to at least three detailed plans of military action, thanks to leaks from the Pentagon. And scarcely a day goes by without someone in the US administration insisting that Iraq represents so potent and immediate a threat that the only responsible course is pre-emptive: to eliminate Saddam Hussein before he eliminates us.

Here in Britain, the Prime Minister infuriated MPs by telling them that he would not necessarily recall Parliament before joining a US-led military assault. He then tried to reassure the rest of us by saying that no decision on military action had been taken and that any such operation, if indeed it happened, was some time away. There followed predictable squawks of protest from predictable quarters about everything from the humiliation of pandering to Washington to the dangers of desert warfare.

Now, I might well have joined the protests – an attack on Iraq seems ill-advised for all the well-rehearsed reasons – but for one thing. I just do not believe that well-publicised US preparations for attacking Iraq are anything other than an elaborate feint on the part of the Bush administration, in likely collusion with the British government. Its purpose is to neutralise the threat from Iraq without the use of miilitary force.

The whole edifice rests on the premise, more readily accepted in Europe than in the US, that the Bush administration is a gun-toting bully, ready to use force at the slightest provocation. While the belligerent language used by Mr Bush and his senior defence officials fosters that image, the reality is different. Mr Bush displayed extreme caution before ordering US forces into Afghanistan. The operation was mounted only after careful planning and its primary aim was not to remove the Taleban, but to catch those responsible for 11 September. Contingency plans were in place for the event that the Taleban fell and for the capture of Kabul, but only through the Northern Alliance forces.

The guiding principle was to expose US forces to the least possible risk. If such restraint was exercised in planning the Afghan operation, it is hard to believe that Washington would act precipitately against Iraq.

With Afghanistan, the use of armed force was unquestionably justified in response to attacks that were universally recognised as acts of war. Iraq has neither threatened nor undertaken any such attacks. Whether it is even potentially capable of doing so is in doubt. While rhetorically belligerent, the Bush administration is not about to launch an all-out attack on Iraq that it cannot win quickly and with minimal casualties. So long as the top brass is warning that this cannot be guaranteed, it will not happen.

In fact, the more elaborate Washington's threats against Iraq have become, the less credible they seem. Take the variety of scenarios emerging from the Pentagon. The first envisaged a three-pronged attack on Iraq involving 200,000 troops converging from neighbouring countries. The latest, reported in The New York Times, recommends seizing key cities, starting with Baghdad, to overthrow Saddam Hussein and neutralise Iraq's weapons capability.

Such news reports create the impression that these scenarios are real plans representing imminent courses of action. But that is to exaggerate their significance. They are merely options, such as any responsible administration commissions from its defence department all the time. That they have seen the light of day, prematurely or at all, is more likely to reflect dissent in the defence establishment than a decision already taken.

Consider also the publicity given to Iraqi exiles in recent weeks. Ahmed Chalabi, the US-based head of the Iraqi National Congress, courted the Clinton administration in the hope that it would recognise the his group as a government in exile. His hopes were never realised. After being initially cold-shouldered by Mr Bush, Mr Chalabi tried again in the new post-11 September circumstances. He was rewarded by a series of interviews in US and European newspapers. Three weeks ago, there was a much-reported gathering of 300 leading Iraqi exiles in London, to discuss – it was said – the formation of a government in exile. The meeting came and went, a committee was formed, a promised announcement of government members last week was postponed. It is now scheduled to take place in Washington in two weeks' time.

Since when have conspirators deliberately held their meetings in the glare of publicity? Kensington Town Hall, where the exiles met, is hardly a low-key venue. Like the hyperbolic war-talk from the Pentagon, the public progress of the government in exile seems calculated less to conquer or pacify Iraq than to attract maximum attention. The clear purpose here is not to act, but to scare.

To scare convincingly, of course, the scare tactics must be realistic. And even with a public as simultaneously apprehensive and aggressive as America's after 11 September, there is the danger that the Bush administration's bluff will eventually be called. This is where Britain has been so useful. While reportedly urging caution on the Americans behind the scenes, Mr Blair has publicly bolstered the notion of Iraq as a long-term threat whenever the presumption of Saddam Hussein's wickedness has seemed to pall.

In the cold light of day, the fact is that the US is still engaged militarily in Afghanistan. Would it really open up a new and riskier front in Iraq? The region is volatile. It is only two months since India and Pakistan came within a whisker of war over Kashmir. Saudi Arabia looks far less stable than the US would like its chief oil supplier to be.

The prospect of a truce, let alone peace, in the Middle East dwindles by the day, leaving Washington's chief regional ally, Israel, perilously exposed. That, according to Donald Rumsfeld this week, was an additional reason why the threat from Iraq has to be averted as a matter of urgency.

This is not a view shared by Arab leaders in the region, as the King of Jordan made clear during his visit to London. Nor is it a view shared by most opponents of US military action against Iraq, in Europe and the US. But the more distinguished and articulate the opposition, the more realistic the likelihood of an attack appears – and the more effective the feint.

The first time that the Bush administration said it would take the fight to Iraq, soon after US bombing had toppled the Taleban, the threat sounded credible. Now that it has been served up for the third, fourth and fifth time, it sounds absurd. I have only two concerns. The British and Europeans clearly hope that Iraq can be scared in to complying with UN resolutions on arms inspections. The Bush administration would clearly like the pressure to result in Saddam's overthrow: will these scenarios come into conflict, and if so which would prevail?

The second concern is a doubt about President Bush. Would he be tempted to move from threatening Iraq to action if Republicans looked likely to suffer heavy losses in the November Congressional elections? I hope not; but that such a thought is even thinkable reflects the depth of Mr Bush's image problem abroad.

m.dejevsky@independent.co.uk