Afghanistan was not a triumph, but a warning

The US has exercised imperial power with no intention of accepting imperial responsibiities

Incredible as it may seem, American voices have started raising the question of their next imperial escapade after Iraq. Bolstered by their success in filming Saddam Hussein's hideous bathrooms, their attention seems to have shifted away from the as yet undisclosed details of an Iraqi settlement, and started wondering, like the Dukes of Hazzard, what their next thrilling TV adventure will be. Speculation has been quietly raised that something might be done about Syria; and after that, maybe Iran? Who knows? After all, the world is their oyster.

The complete mind-boggling insanity revealed by such musings is remarkable enough, but the real question is how on earth such an imperial policy to be implemented? It is, to say the least, a novel approach to turn from one inimical regime to the next with such alacrity. The answer is simple. If, as it seems, your policy is to march in, depose the power and then promptly bugger off, washing your hands of any kind of responsibility, then there is no real reason why you need not do it twice a year. The consequences of this interesting pattern of behaviour, however, ought to act as some kind of a deterrent.

We haven't heard a great deal about Afghanistan recently. Readers of Western newspapers might reasonably assume that the country has attained a Francis Fukuyama-type state of historical nirvana, so little interest does it seem to hold. The assumption seems to be that Western forces marched in, removed the Taliban from power, and returned the country to a stable and democratic state, to universal rejoicing.

This sunny picture is not, in fact, entirely accurate, either as an account of what has been achieved or what Afghanistan's future is likely to hold. It should be remembered that Western forces moved into Afghanistan not to remove the Taliban, but to seize and destroy the al-Qa'ida network in hiding in the country. That aim failed, and we were subsequently informed that, in fact, the principal aim of the war had been to remove the Taliban, and the whole business had been a triumphant success.

It seems obvious to any observer that, in reality, the Taliban and their supporters and allies were following, in meticulous detail, the well-tested strategy of Afghans throughout history whenever faced with a foreign invader. It has worked infallibly before, from the First Afghan War onwards. In short, you don't attempt to defend the urban centres, but withdraw and leave them to the enemy. You regroup in the impenetrable mountains for a period, and then, when your strength has been rebuilt in peace and quiet, begin a guerrilla war of attrition on the now scattered forces of your enemy. In the case of the Soviet occupation, this proved enough on its own. In other circumstances, such as the First Afghan War, it was a preface to a swift and bloody massacre of underprepared opponents.

It is quite clear to me that, far from the war being over, we are now at the beginning of the second stage of this strategy. Western media sought to persuade us that the Taliban and similar factions had no popular support in the country. There was no hesitation in excluding them from the loya jirga that established an interim government, and, despite some gestures towards a process of reconciliation, their voice has been excluded from political life as if no one voluntarily subscribed to their ideas. This view, no doubt sincerely held, was based on the opinions of sophisticated urban Kabul. It seems to me most unlikely that the Taliban could have held on to power if they had really been so small a minority, and it is unwise to assume that the opinions they held have melted away like snow in the sun.

In the present climate, it would not be a bad idea to start paying serious attention to the increasing incidence of rapid and brutal assaults on isolated government representatives, and on international organisations. These events, which have been on the increase recently, may not be the last sputters of a dying fire; they may represent the same thing as Akbar's successful and brutal raids on isolated British troops during the interregnum of 1839-1842. It should be of great concern that very few of the irregular forces have been tempted to enlist in the new national army; it should act as a warning that very few communities outside Kabul were prepared to permit women to lay aside their burkhas.

In short, I think something terrible may be about to occur in the near future in Afghanistan. I think, just as in other proposed and actual American episodes, they have exercised imperial power without the slightest intention of accepting imperial responsibilities. But responsibility cannot be evaded. What they may be about to take responsibility for, in Afghanistan, are events which they have not properly envisaged, and which may wreak terrible destruction on the country, and what remains of the credibility of their foreign policy.

p.hensher@independent.co.uk