Scientists should stand up to the government – showing remorse over mistakes is not Johnson’s strong suit

The blame game is an easy one to play, but both sides will end up damaged if they aren’t careful

Experts advising the government on coronavirus have always known the politicians might try to make them the fall guys when the reckoning comes.

Chris Whitty, England’s chief medical officer, even joked about the advisers’ vulnerability. He told the Royal College of Physicians in February: “At the other side, one of two things will happen. Either I will be in front of a committee of inquiry explaining why it is we failed to prepare adequately for this Armageddon or … [asked] why did you spend all this money on an epidemic that never happened.”

That inevitable public inquiry is now no joke for ministers or their scientific advisers. Three months on, it is obvious that mistakes have been made. Emergency planning was for a flu pandemic, not a disease like Sars or Mers. Initially, the government was slow to act, ensure enough personal protective equipment and testing and to protect care homes.

The politicians dismiss such criticisms as “a caricature”, but are rehearsing their lines for the blame game the inquiry will bring. Therese Coffey, the work and pensions secretary, told Sky News: “If the science was wrong, I’m not surprised if people will then think we made a wrong decision.”

Downing Street distanced itself from her remarks; buck passing in public is not a good look, and Boris Johnson needs the scientists to provide some cover for very difficult decisions on easing the lockdown.

But scientists suspect Coffey let the cat out of the bag, and fired back a warning shot. Angela McClean, the refreshingly plain-speaking deputy chief scientific adviser, told last night’s Downing Street press conference: “The advice we gave [on testing in the community] certainly took account of what testing was available.” Ministers believe Public Health England should be held responsible for testing strategy, while the quango points a finger at the Department for Health.

A blame game was probably inevitable after such an unprecedented crisis. The official line, that a reckoning should be left to another day so as not to distract from the fight against the virus, doesn’t hold water. Lessons must be learnt from mistakes in time to get things right in later stages – for example, on testing and, hopefully, when a vaccine is available.

Advice was always more nuanced than implied by ministers’ mantra that they were “guided by scientists”. There are echoes here of Tony Blair’s ill-fated dossier on Iraq’s non-existent weapons of mass destruction. As one Whitehall insider told me: “If you edit out the advisers’ caveats, the public gets a very different impression.” The Chilcot inquiry found that judgments about Iraq’s WMD capability were “presented with a certainty that was not justified.” In contrast to Blair’s statement in his September 2002 dossier, intelligence “had not established beyond doubt that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons.”

Chilcot found that intelligence chiefs shared the blame, for not protecting their integrity in the way their work was used. In other words, they should have stood up to ministers. Today’s scientists should take note. There’s always temptation for advisers to tell their masters what they want to hear.

I suspect there have been times during this crisis when politicians and scientists have met in the middle. Initially, scientists were sceptical the public would support a lockdown, but when public opinion shifted amid a shutdown in Europe, they re-ran some modelling and produced different results.

Ministers know the coronavirus inquiry will be very different to Sir John Chilcot’s investigation, which took almost seven years and did not report until 2016, nine years after Blair left office. Judgment day for Johnson will come well before the next general election. Chilcot probably changed very few minds on Iraq; the caravan had long since moved on. In contrast, every person in the country will have a stake and an interest in the coronavirus inquiry, so its impact is potentially explosive.

While there was a case for not publishing intelligence chiefs’ caveats at the time, avoiding political embarrassment is no reason for withholding minutes of Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (Sage) meetings. The vast majority of its papers remain undisclosed; those published were heavily redacted, and the suspicion is that any criticism of ministerial decisions was been blacked out.

Johnson and his ministers would have more credibility if they accept responsibility for some mistakes, rather than being in denial about them or pointing the finger at someone else – whether scientists, Public Health England, NHS England or civil servants. Robert Buckland, the justice secretary, took an important step in the right direction today, acknowledging on Sky News the initial focus on testing in hospitals had an impact on care homes.

Let’s hope other ministers, Johnson included, can also show some contrition. If they can’t, they will forfeit the public’s trust.