How the Iraqi mouse made the West's elephant dance

President Clinton had a bad crisis, Saddam Hussein a good one. The US still needs a credible Middle East policy

THE United States and Britain have achieved their narrow aim of obtaining unfettered access for UN weapons inspectors with no time limit on their activities imposed by Baghdad. By every other measure Saddam Hussein has succeeded through skilful management of the present crisis in escaping the political and economic isolation that defeat in the Gulf war placed Iraq seven years ago. "Saddam has certainly out-thought the Clinton administration," says Laith Kubba, an Iraqi opposition intellectual. "The US has behaved like an elephant with no brain, so even a mouse like Saddam can make it dance to his tune."

The very presence of Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, in Baghdad this weekend marks the return of Iraq as a player in the Middle East. It showed that President Saddam is still in business and likely to remain so. It also underlines his success in using the dependence of the UN weapons inspection team (Unscom) on his co-operation to work in Iraq, a dependence which enables him to switch crises on and off at his own convenience.

Yesterday the Iraqi leader chose to switch off the crisis, probably well pleased with the gains he has made. This is masked by international focus on his biological and chemical weapons as a measure of his power. In fact Unscom is only one of three methods employed by the US to contain Iraq since 1991 and probably the least effective. The other two are economic sanctions and the military alliance of the US, Britain and the south Gulf states created to fight the Gulf war. Both have been significantly weakened by the present crisis.

Economic sanctions have been partially lifted by the decision of the UN Security Council to increase the value of oil Iraq is allowed to export every six months from $2.1bn (pounds 1.3bn) to $5.2bn. The Iraqi response is to object to the whole arrangement, saying that it cannot export more than $4bn without repairing oil equipment damaged in the first Gulf war. But the Security Council can hardly will the end without willing the means. Presumably spare parts will be allowed through. In effect Iraq will be able to export about two million barrels a day of crude oil, which is two-thirds of its export level before sanctions were imposed in August 1990.

The most important method of containing Iraq is the military alliance against it. The core of this is the US, Britain and the south Gulf states, notably Saudi Arabia. The alliance now looks much more ragged than could have been expected even six months ago. The Gulf states, and above all Saudi Arabia, have shown an extreme lack of enthusiasm in lining up with the US and Britain. Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia is said to have told Madeleine Albright, the US Secretary of State, that his country is finding its guard dogs (presumably the US and Britain) more expensive to feed than the wolf (Iraq) whom they were supposed to guard it against.

If Arab rulers had any doubts about the sympathies of their subjects, then these were probably put to rest by the riots in M'An in Jordan over the weekend. Suddenly, television screens across the Arab world were showing rioters showering police with stones and wounding four of them with machine gun fire after a pro-Iraqi demonstrator was killed.

For President Clinton it has not been a good crisis. He has paid for his neglect of the Middle East since he took office in 1993. He inherited the legacy of President Bush's victory in the Gulf War which established American predominance in the Middle East. In 1993 the Oslo accords seemed to make it possible that the Israeli - Palestinian conflict would be defused by the Palestinians winning the right to establish a national state in Gaza and on the West Bank.

It never happened. President Clinton's pro-Israeli bias helped undermine Oslo. At the same time, two other legs of his Middle East policy were in trouble. These were the "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran. Both countries were to be isolated politically, militarily and economically. Against Iraq failure was partial, but against Iran it was almost total. One result of the outcome of the latest crisis with Iraq may be that the US will cultivate Iran, which is a traditional enemy of Saddam Hussein.

Washington does not seem to perceive that its whole Middle East policy is in trouble. Last week Mrs Albright, who talks tough but has proved ineffective during the present crisis, said there was no connection between the confrontation between the US and Saddam Hussein and the Arab-Israeli conflict. What this means is that there is no connection in terms of State Department policy, but in reality the US failure to broker an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians has contributed significantly to its inability to rally support in the Arab world against Iraq.

In retrospect the US might have been wiser to rely more on the traditional methods of economic embargo rather than weapons inspections to contain Iraq. After all President Saddam had far more chemical and biological weapons and the means to deliver them in 1991 but the threat of retaliation deterred him from using them. The inhibition should apply more forcibly today.

President Clinton and Tony Blair can fairly say that they have saved Unscom and allowed it to operate freely for as long as it wants. They will add that Iraq blinked at the last moment in the face of bombing. In reality, the White House was always more nervous that it appeared at committing itself to an air offensive without a clear political or military objective. Otherwise, it would scarcely have mandated Mr Annan to go to Baghdad. The weapons inspections will go ahead, but the real significance of the outcome of the crisis is that Saddam Hussein is well and truly out of the box where Washington kept him after his defeat in Kuwait.