Leading Article: Fighting off despair

THE size of the conference on former Yugoslavia that starts in London tomorrow is impressive. Leaders from the dismembered state will find themselves among 28 delegations, most led by foreign ministers. The permanent members of the United Nations Security Council will be there, the Group of Seven, the European Community and Balkan neighbours. Minorities such as the Kosovo Albanians will also attend, but not for the plenary sessions. If international weight alone were enough to push the warring factions to a settlement, the tragic story would be all but over.

Unfortunately, the leaders of former Yugoslavia have developed the habit of attending peace conferences, signing almost any piece of paper put before them, dining well, and then going home to carry on exactly as before. For the Serbs these tactics have paid off. In Croatia and Bosnia they have been able to conquer most of the territory they want, 'cleanse' it to their satisfaction and sit on the result. The outside world has huffed and puffed and done very little. Why should they change their habits merely because a few more statesmen have put aside a day or two to make speeches about them? Indeed, they may even hope that in a larger gathering it will be easier to divide their critics.

Against that background it would be very easy to succumb to despair. There are at least four good reasons for resisting the temptation. First, huge and horrible wrongs have been done. More than two million innocent people have been driven from their homes. Borders have been changed by force. Tens of thousands have been killed, tortured, imprisoned and starved. Democratic countries could not look themselves in the face if they shrugged and passed by on the other side.

Second, there is still a very acute danger that the fighting will spread. Kosovo could explode at any moment. Macedonia is near breakdown. Hungarian minorities feel threatened. The possibilities are endless. Having blundered so badly in Croatia and Bosnia, the outside world still has a chance to draw a line against further trouble.

Third, the way in which the West responds to the Balkan crisis sends signals to other disaffected minorities and nationalist leaders in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. These signals need to be much clearer on subjects such as the meaning of self-determination, the protection of minorities and the conditions under which nationalities can expect statehood. The longer the muddle round these questions persists, the greater the temptation to take risks.

Fourth, the conference has a chance of success. It is not a peace conference. It will not try to negotiate a settlement. The hope is that it can provide the impetus and pressure for real negotiations and quick moves on humanitarian issues. It should carry more weight than previous peace conferences and be driven by a greater sense of outrage. It should also be more vividly aware of the danger of the conflict spreading. But it will need to show real teeth if it is to make any impact.

Among other things it will be asked to consider a severe tightening of sanctions. There are also hopes of flooding the area with observers. Beyond that looms the possibility of military involvement. With sufficient determination among the Western powers, there is a chance of persuading the parties involved that they will suffer real pain if they do not respond to international pressure. That will not solve the problem of extracting a just and lasting settlement from the mess, which will take a long time, but it would be a start. The alternative is to accept injustice and by doing so invite more. The cost of inaction will then rise even higher than it is at present.