Iran withdrawing from the nuclear deal could be the most dangerous consequence of the current crisis

A nuclear-armed Iran, sooner or later, now looks inevitable. It is something the world can little afford

Whatever impelled Donald Trump to order the assassination of a senior member of Iran’s ruling elite, the creation of a new nuclear power in the Middle East was probably not his intention. Yet Iran’s confirmation that it is to formally rescind the last remaining international obligations governing its nuclear programme seems set to do precisely that.

Whatever its weaknesses – and the Iranians were always inclined to push their luck – the 2015 international nuclear agreement between Iran, the United States, Russia, China and three European powers (the UK, France and Germany) did have the effect of at least restraining Tehran’s plans, and keeping them under some degree of international supervision. Although Iran has still not actually legally withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), to give its proper name, the deal is dead. This is a dangerous moment.

When the crowds at the obsequies for General Qassem Soleimani chant “death to America”, and Tehran promises “revenge” and to attack American assets, this is usually taken to mean it will pick one or more items from the usual menu of retaliation. Such high-profile and dramatic measures might include: seizure of western-owned oil tankers or other ships navigating the Strait of Hormuz; attacks on American and allied personnel, civilian and military, in the Middle East and possibly beyond; rockets fired at Saudi oil wells; and intensified harassment of dual nationality citizens held illegally in Iran, such as Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe.

All would be grievous, and all would invite more retaliation from the United Sates or its allies. However, in the longer term, the acquisition of a viable and effective nuclear arsenal by Iran represents a threat to peace on an entirely different scale – far greater and more permanent than any other Iranian retaliation. For the Iranians have learned well the lesson they observe from around the world – that America tries to bully and cajole and sanction other, smaller, poorer nations, but if they possess nuclear missiles, then America’s threats often turn out to be a bluff.

George W Bush once put North Korea and Iran in the same category – the “axis of evil” – though Iran was not then close to becoming a nuclear power. Soon it could be so, and will be able to taunt Washington back, just as Kim Jong-un has for years. Indeed, Iran and North Korea have long surreptitiously cooperated on nuclear technology, so it would hardly be a surprise if the Iranians were able to accelerate their programme and develop a deterrent of their own. This “breakout time” cannot be easily estimated, even by the Iranians, but it is far shorter than it was, and far too short for anyone in the region to be reassured about the future.

America and its allies are neither stupid nor ill-informed. They are wise to the risks. The US, Israel and Saudi Arabia have all been observing Iran for some years and, it is assumed, have some intelligence on Iran’s capabilities and intentions. America realised, for example, before the 2015 deal, that Iran was a matter of a year or two away from engineering nuclear munitions that could reach Israel or the Gulf states.

That was why the Obama administration and the others negotiated the 2015 JCPOA, as a sensible alternative to bombing Iran. It is why the Europeans, China and Russia are still keen to keep the deal alive, even as America and now Iran are finally abandoning it. An unstable, erratic Iran armed with nuclear weaponry facing a nuclear Israel and an erratic and unstable White House is no one’s formula for a safer world.

One of the more likely outcomes of such rising tensions has been discussed many times in recent years – which is that Israel would feel justified in bombing the Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities for self-defence. It did this before, in Iraq, when Saddam Hussein was secretly attempting to join the international nuclear club in the 1980s, and it was successful (though it did not prevent him from trying to acquire other weapons of mass destruction). This time it would invite yet more retaliation from Iran and its militia proxies surrounding Israel. And, from there, a possible spiral into low-level proxy warfare between Israel and Iran, analogous, though not as extensive, as the proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia that have raged in Yemen. If Israel and Iran were both nuclear powers (Israel is widely believed to be but has never confirmed or denied it) the geopolitics of the whole Middle East would alter – and others, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, will feel the need to develop their own deterrent: a mushroom cloud waiting to happen.

In fact, an Israeli bombing campaign, or an American one for that matter, might not succeed in knocking out all of Iran’s nuclear programme, though it would disrupt it and buy the world some time. There would – if no adequate warnings were given – be civilian casualties. Last year it was reported that President Trump was “cocked and loaded”, but cancelled his planned bombing raid on Iran with 10 minutes to spare when he learned that there would be 150 casualties. Would he this time simply issue a warning or ultimatum? In any case, Iran would again feel compelled to hit back.

As with all such international games of chicken, the result may be that one side or the other quietly backs down with some face-saving concession. Then diplomatic back channels are used to prevent an all-out conflagration that every participant knows would benefit none and damage all. But “regime change” in Iran, even after a concentrated American attack, remains inconceivable, and a nuclear-armed Iran, sooner or later, now looks inevitable. It will be one of Donald Trump’s less impressive acts of his self-confessed “very stable genius”.