Russian spy ships are coming into our waters and we must respond

The defence secretary has revealed the growing threat from Russia after one of their ships was discovered spying in British waters, writes Keir Giles. It is part of a worrying pattern of behaviour that can only be met by bolstering our key defences

There have been strong words from Defence secretary John Healey after a British submarine had to warn off a Russian spy ship in UK waters. His message for Russia was: “We know what you are doing. And we will not shy away from robust action to protect this country.”

It’s the “robust action” part that’s important. In the run-up to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Western leaders also told Vladimir Putin that they knew what he was doing – but without the threat of consequences for doing it that were meaningful for the Kremlin, there was no reason for him not to go ahead and do it.

Now, Healey’s claimed change to “rules of engagement” is a clear warning to Russia. Whether it will be heeded is another question. Turkey, for instance, clearly explained its rules of engagement to Russia in 2015 in response to repeated airspace violations by Russian military aircraft operating in Syria. Russia chose to disregard those warnings until Turkey shot down one of those aircraft, after which Russia chose to treat Turkish warnings with greater respect.

HMS Somerset escorting a Russian submarine through the English Channel (PA)

With the real picture hidden deep in murky waters (or equally deeply classified), it’s impossible to know from the outside just what the Yantar spy ship has been detected doing to the UK’s sub-sea infrastructure: reconnaissance, probing for vulnerabilities, or simply a demonstrative presence designed to test Britain’s response.

It’s not a new issue. After years of increasing concern over how much damage Russia could do to the economies of this country and others through targeting subsea cables, this week the UK’s Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy launched an inquiry into the UK’s ability to defend its undersea infrastructure.

But there’s no doubt the underwater confrontation is becoming more intense. Nato has stepped up a major maritime operation in the Baltic Sea after several undersea cables were cut by vessels in Russia’s “shadow fleet” of oil tankers, most recently on Christmas Day.

There’s public expectation that the UK should be able to protect its own waters. But there’s also concern over the reduced size of the Royal Navy affecting its ability to do so, even before a significant portion of Britain’s available warships – and of its most modern combat aircraft – is despatched to the Far East later this year.

Meanwhile, Russia will continue to probe and test, both at sea and in other domains. It’s no wonder there has been growing alarm over the government’s refusal to contemplate the kind of defence spending that other countries under threat from Russia consider essential to deter a conflict – or, if deterrence fails, to survive it.

The decision to draw public attention to the incident may also mark a shift in British policy. Attempts to assess the scope of Russia’s covert campaign across Europe have been hampered by the widely differing national approaches to publicising, or concealing, incidents and the responses to them.

When Russia’s planting of incendiary devices on cargo aircraft was disclosed, it was not as a result of those devices going off in warehouses in Germany or in the UK, but instead Poland’s intelligence services describing the overall plan. And that fits with a general tendency that those countries closer to Russia, and more sensitive to the implications of Moscow’s campaigns, have been those most willing to disclose to their public what is happening and what is at stake.

In the case of the UK, the public remains woefully uninformed as to the extent of damage that Russia could do to the country, and the circumstances under which it might choose to do so.

Unlike in previous centuries, distance does not lend protection, and the fact that the active war is happening at the far end of the continent does not mean that the UK is immune from attack. Russia has been working hard at delivering destruction from warships, submarines and aircraft at ranges of thousands of kilometres.

That means that when the time comes when Russia is ready to launch missiles at members of Nato, the UK presents a tempting target – not only because of potential gaps in its defences, but also because of the outsize role it plays in unifying and leading European resistance to Russia.

Missiles and spy ships aren’t the only way Russia can harm Britain at a distance. Critical infrastructure has also been identified as a target for Russian cyber power too, with urgent warnings in late 2024 of the potential consequences of an attack on the energy grid.

For now, Russia’s war on Europe continues at a lower level. Russia uses proxies to conduct operations that are then deniable (whether plausibly or not). That means that as well as the armed forces, law enforcement agencies are in the front line of protecting both people and infrastructure in the target countries.

That’s been key, for instance, to Finland’s response after a major cable-cutting incident in the Baltic at the end of 2024. The investigation is still underway, but impounding the vessel and launching a criminal prosecution for the damage done will deter future actions through showing the consequences for the proxies rather than for the Kremlin itself.

That’s also put forward as the best approach for dealing with incidents in the UK that so far remain publicly unexplained – such as drone flights causing disruption over airports and security alerts over British and US airbases. But it all requires strong intelligence, clear situational awareness and prepared and well-resourced law enforcement, all informed by the rising threat.

With Russia still seeming bent on confrontation, it remains to be seen whether John Healey’s strong words to the Kremlin will be backed up with the action the UK needs.