Why Friedrich Merz is the right man to unite Europe against Trump

Before he has formed a coalition, or even been declared chancellor, the winner of Germany’s snap election has quickly assumed an even more critical role – that of Europe’s de facto leader… and, says Mary Dejevsky, one who has a crucial three-inch advantage over the US president

Claiming his victory in the German election, Friedrich Merz, leader of the centre-right CDU, said that his absolute priority was “to strengthen Europe so that we are independent from the United States”.

Hitherto known as a fervent Atlanticist and friend of the United States, the man set to be the next German chancellor also cast doubt on the future of Nato without American support.

He was only a little less categorical at a press conference the next day, where he expressed the hope for good transatlantic relations, but also reiterated the “need very rapidly to [...] be able to organise our own defence”.

These are, of course, early days. Merz has yet to form a coalition – although the arithmetic makes a so-called “grand coalition” with the centre-left SPD the most probable option, given that any association with the second-placed far-right AfD is ruled out. And the terms could take a while for the leaders to hammer out, given differences on such basics as tax policy and migration.

On defence and security policy, on the other hand, it was the centre-right, with its wholehearted commitment to close transatlantic relations, to Nato and to the US security umbrella, that could have been thought the outlier. Pretty much all other parties harboured varying reservations while paying lip service to Atlanticism, with the exception of the anti-Nato AfD. In only a couple of sentences on election night, Merz shattered all those distinctions and turned CDU – and all German – security policy on its head.

It is possible that this should be seen more as staking out a position that could be adjusted as and when, rather than – as yet – a complete reorientation of German policy, given that Merz at his press conference noted that Washington might not have said the “last word”. But the overall shift in the US, which now sets China, and not Europe, as the priority, is surely for real. And that in turn dictates that a rapprochement with Russia is more important than continuing support for Ukraine.

Having been blindsided by the abrupt US policy turn two weeks ago, European leaders seem to be gradually converging on a view that accepts that talks to end the Ukraine war are probably imminent, even as they compete with each other to offer military, economic and, especially, rhetorical support to Ukraine. This much was on display at an event called the Support Ukraine summit in Kyiv, marking the third anniversary of the Russian invasion.

It was notable, however, that while the leaders of Canada and another dozen countries attended in person, the UK and the secretary general of Nato, among others, made their contributions remotely. Notable, too, was that the French foreign minister, who was among the last to speak, was also one of few to assert directly that a “turning point” had been reached with the sharp policy U-turn from Washington.

This could well be because such a turn was less unwelcome to France than to many other European countries. President Emmanuel Macron has long favoured the concept of “strategic autonomy” for Europe, which would entail greater defence self-reliance for Europe, and at least a partial decoupling from the United States.

Macron was thwarted in advancing his ideas by two developments: the war in Ukraine that underlined for many the necessity of US involvement in European security; and his political weakness, following last summer’s parliamentary elections, which left the far-right National Rally party of Marine Le Pen as the main opposition and paralysed much decision-making. The idea of “strategic autonomy” could now make a comeback, with German support – a possibility some are terming the return of Gaullism.

This could also have the secondary effect of strengthening the position of the governments in both countries, where far-right opposition is in the ascendant. Both National Rally and the AfD are reconciled to their countries’ continued membership of the EU – a position underlined, perhaps, by watching Brexit from the sidelines – but are far more sceptical of Nato. This is not to say that what could be a fragile centre-right/centre-left coalition in Germany would be more likely to survive or that France would become any more governable. But it could draw the sting of far-right opposition in parliament, and perhaps even open the way for the revival of the French-German dynamo, giving a fresh impetus to the EU.

Such a development could place the central and East European countries, which have been among the most wedded to Nato, as well as the UK in quite a tricky position – or rather, in an even more tricky position than they currently are, given that they are also the countries most vocal in their hostility to Russia and support for Ukraine.

But the fact that membership of the EU and Nato now overlaps more than before, now that Sweden and Finland have abandoned their neutrality, and neutral Austria has a government led by the far right, the result could be greater cohesion in the EU and a resurrection of European defence and security policy that has languished in recent years.

Given Macron’s current political weakness – and the constitutional bar on his standing for re-election if he survives in office until 2027 – coupled with the UK’s departure from the EU, the role of de facto European leader could well fall to Merz, in the same way as it did to Angela Merkel – ironically, Merz’s deadly rival when they were in CDU politics together.

This, however, would depend on Merz being able to run a stable ship, something that could be more likely if, as he has indicated, the defeated centre-left leader Olaf Scholz stays clear of the new coalition and his successor was the popular Boris Pistorius, who could also retain his position as defence minister.

There are reasons – serious and less serious – why Merz could well carry this off and why he could also take over the role coveted by the UK as the “bridge” to Washington. Merz says he has no illusions about Donald Trump. But they also have more in common than might be thought.

Merz, a wealthy former businessman and corporate lawyer, worked for the US mega-investment company BlackRock and is familiar with New York and the US business world. Less seriously, Merz stands at 6ft 6in – which gives him a three-inch height advantage over Trump, who is used to being the “big guy” in the room. The body language between the two could be interesting.

What all this adds up to is a faint hope that the transatlantic rift that now seems to be written in the stars could be avoided. If it isn’t, Europe in the shape of the EU could be in a better position than it might have expected, both to resist whatever trade pressure the US may decide to exert, but also – perhaps sooner rather than later – to look after its own defence.

This does not mean that there could not be considerable strains on the EU, but more particularly on Nato, if Europe and the US start to go their separate ways, or that there would not be losers. For a start, the question of a European nuclear deterrent could rear its head.

And the UK could find itself with its existing dilemmas sharpened: supplanted by Germany as the recognised bridge across the Atlantic, and finally forced to confront the choice between Europe and the US that it has for so long done its utmost to avoid.