As military and Nato leaders meet in Paris over Ukraine, how will a coalition of the willing work?

Despite some comments to the contrary, Europe can, in a number of areas, make up for the banned US support, writes Francis Tusa. The UK’s role in this, however, is somewhat of an open question

The meeting of Nato defence chiefs in Paris will have seen major changes to its agenda, with the fast-moving pace of events of the past week. Although it was intended to flesh out proposals to create a robust peacekeeping force to be deployed to Ukraine after a ceasefire (this will still be discussed), there will be some more immediate issues that will also require attention.

The withdrawal of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine has had instant, detrimental effects, especially regarding the ability of Ukrainian artillery to target vital Russian military assets. This act doesn’t just cover US Defence Department intelligence, but also satellite imagery from American commercial providers, which has made things even harder for Ukrainian forces.

But on top of this, the suspension of all US military support has made Ukraine especially exposed – and countering the effects of this will likely be a vital element of the Paris conference. Working out which country has what, and how quickly it can be sent to Ukraine, will certainly be a major ask from Ukrainian delegates.

Speed will be vital, especially for things such as surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), vital to defend Ukraine against heavy Russian missile/drone attacks. One problem is that many European armed forces use US-built SAMs, and it is likely that they will not be allowed to send them to Ukraine.

The most recent area where the US will cease support to Ukraine is for the reprogramming of radar jammers found on the F-16s, currently supplied by European air forces. As the Ukraine war has shown, both sides have been able to adapt systems on the battlefield often on a near-daily basis, and this is true for radars and radar jammers. Without the bespoke systems to adapt software, quite quickly, Ukraine’s F-16 jammers will lose their abilities to jam Russian SAMs, making them more vulnerable.

Despite some comments to the contrary, Europe can, in a number of areas, make up for the banned US support. France, Italy, and Germany all have military observation satellites (France launched the last of its high-resolution CSO-3 satellites less than a week ago) that could provide the necessary imagery, and there are also commercial operators whose imagery could be supplied.

European ammunition production has been increased markedly over the past two years, too, and missile companies have ramped up production rates. And there are European radar jammers that have been integrated onto the F-16, so US systems could be replaced. The story is not entirely a dark one – but the speed of delivery is the vital issue for Kyiv. The erratic dribble of weaponry to Ukraine will need to become a guaranteed flowing pipeline.

But the 30-plus defence chiefs will start to tackle the thorny issue(s) of who will provide what to any planned peacekeeping force. The background briefings have oscillated widely as to how many troops might be needed. President Zelensky has previously said that a force of at least 200,000 troops would be needed – a figure that would be very much an ask for Europe if this were to be deployed indefinitely.

Figures of a “tripwire force” – a more token deployment, but one which would show Russia that Europe would be willing to have skin (and blood) in any game – could be as small as 20,000. But a figure of around 100,000 troops (not just from armies, but also air forces) seems to be one that has received wide agreement among European planners.

Achievable? Yes. Although governments will have to look quite deeply at what their forces would have to plan to cut as regards other commitments.

There have been reports that countries such as Poland are in some way “hostile” to the peacekeeping plan, and the prime minister, Donald Tusk, had said that no Polish troops would be in the force. However, this was more likely as a result of Poland sharing a frontier with Russia, and so not wishing to weaken their home forces. Similar constraints are likely to apply to the Baltic states and Finland. However, outright opposition has, and will, come from Hungary and Slovakia.

Equally, the role that the UK will play in this force is somewhat of an open question. The first briefings said that the UK would put in 20-35,000 troops. At the time, British army planners were amazed by these figures, as they had not been asked whether they could find the troops – they couldn’t.

The past weeks have seen the number that the UK might provide drop down to closer to 10-12,000 – possible, but probably not on an indefinite basis. Actually, at the November 2024 Atlantic Future Forum conference held in London, there had actually been more talk of the UK providing a robust air force for Ukraine, rather than ground forces. Bearing in mind the weakened state of the British army, an emphasis on fighters might help defence planners.

Arguably, the biggest concern will be any US ban on the deployment of any US-supplied equipment into Ukraine as part of any peacekeeping force. An army such as Germany’s or the Netherlands’ uses the US-built Patriot missiles as the backbone of its defence against enemy air power. What would it do if Washington refused to allow this to be deployed?