Political Commentary: A leader in search of a direction

REFERENCES to John Smith in Tony Benn's diaries are sparing, but friendly. In the volume covering the period when Mr Benn was Mr Smith's boss at the Department of Energy during the final Wilson years, Mr Benn records that Nicky Kaldor, the economist, suggested in December 1975 that the government's economic problems were so serious that it would be better for the government to be out and for the Tories to be left to cope: 'John Smith thought the party would never forgive us for quitting and running. They would never elect us again.' Mr Smith was 'right really', comments Mr Benn, though he confesses to a sneaking sympathy with the Kaldor view.

It nevertheless comes as a surprise, after the travails which put them on diametrically opposite wings of the party in the early Eighties, to find that Tony Benn is expected to cast his vote for Mr Smith in the leadership election next weekend. This is not some sudden rush of revisionist blood to Mr Benn's head. It stems from a decision that since, in his view, party members do not have enough say in deciding the leadership, he, as the MP for Chesterfield, would abide by the decision of his local party.

What it does illustrate is how far removed the Labour leadership contest has been from those angrily fought left-right contests after the party's defeat in 1979. It has not made headlines in anything like the same way; bitterness, where it has existed, has been submerged; it has not even been a fundamental debate between two opposing views of where the party should go between now and the next election. It has been, in short, something of a political non-event.

Why? First, the result of the most important contest, between Mr Smith and Bryan Gould for the leadership, was a foregone conclusion almost from the start. By winning overwhelmingly in the constituencies and the Parliamentary Labour Party, Mr Smith is legitimised, even though the electoral system itself is discredited.

And, as it turns out, the same goes for Margaret Beckett as deputy. It's true that the initial impetus for her campaign came from what still looks like a crude, old- fashioned stitch-up by the TGWU and GMB unions, the former of which sponsors Ms Beckett and the latter Mr Smith. But with the help of that deal - and Mr Smith's preference for her - she now has between 60 and 70 per cent of the constituency vote. If she wins the Nupe ballot - against the advice of the union's executive, which wanted John Prescott - it will legitimise her victory even further. Mr Prescott may yet be the choice of Nupe members, but they rejected their leader's recommendation to vote for Michael Meacher in 1983.

The second reason is the nature of modern party leadership contests. The excitement of the Tory leadership contest in November 1990 was in the personalities of the candidates, the uncertainty of the outcome, and the fact that whoever won would instantly become Prime Minister. It was not a contest of explicit political differences, on Europe, the economy, or even the key issue of the poll tax. Once Michael Heseltine had made it clear he would scrap the tax, Douglas Hurd and John Major rapidly followed suit. There is something to be said for the view that electoral contests of this sort obscure rather than open up political divisions.

That is especially true where the candidates must appeal to varying sectional interests. There have been differences between the deputy leadership candidates - for example on Labour's links with the unions - but they have been cautiously, even tentatively, defined, and on extremely narrow ground. Indeed Mr Gould's decision to make the debate more fundamental at the outset - for example, on the tax proposals on which Labour fought the election - probably lessened his chances of victory in the deputy leadership contest. He had argued that it was not the best time for such a debate, but his experience will hardly encourage candidates to raise ideological issues in future leadership contests - which will anyway be much shorter.

All of which suggests that the real decisions that determine the future direction of the party under Mr Smith will be taken after, perhaps many months after, his inevitable coronation next weekend.

There are, of course, short- term questions - the shape of the new Shadow Cabinet for example. The PLP prides itself on being the most sophisticated electorate in this world. But if it has justice as well as sophistication, then it is difficult to see how it could deny fresh places to likely candidates such as George Robertson for his mastery of the European brief, Harriet Harman, for her successful general election campaign, or for Chris Smith for his intelligence and application as a member of John Smith's Treasury team.

But the real issues transcend personalities. And the most real of all is between 'one more heave' and continued change in the party's organisation and policy.

There are already nascent dialogues over whether Labour can win over the floating voter by appeals to altruism or whether it needs to harness the enlightened self-interest of the electorate. The way to achieve the latter, Gordon Brown and Tony Blair have implied, is by convincing middle income earners that their individual interests are served by paying for services that help the less well off and in turn prevent decay, crime and the social insecurity which affect everyone.

That would require a big advance; a movement from the vital, but largely negative, shedding of unacceptable policies between 1987 and 1992 to the positive. And, curiously, the biggest danger is that Labour becomes the victim of its short-term parliamentary and political success. With some fresh Cabinet faces, with a leader of outstanding Parliamentary accomplishment, and with a Tory Party at constant risk of fragmentation over Europe, Labour could look distinctly dangerous by the winter and the spring of next year. Two consequences could flow from that: one is that the party could be tempted, for short-term political reasons, to relax its espousal of a tight monetary policy based on ERM. Those in favour would argue that, with Tories unstable on that very issue, there could be considerable gains in doing so. Those against would argue that Labour would ditch its long- term economic credibility by becoming known once again as a party of devaluation.

But the other is that it basks in a false sense of security which makes further changes of policy and organisation seem unnecessary. Some of the key reforms achieved by Neil Kinnock were secured when Labour was trailing in the polls: the assault on Militant in the 1985-87 period, the ditching of unilateralism in 1987- 89. Short-term success can breed complacency. The worst mistake would be for Labour to think that the Tories' 7.5 per cent lead in the general election was within an acceptable margin of error and did not expose a fundamental deficit.

The most important aspect of a rather boring campaign, has been that the incoming leader has cannily left open all his options on these questions. That means there will certainly be a war for John Smith's ear, the outcome of which may determine the result of the next general election. But the reformers have one important factor in their favour; Mr Smith has not become leader of the party for any purpose other than to become prime minister. He is as eager for power in the Nineties as he was appalled at the prospect of losing it in the Seventies.